Impacts of U.S. Sugar Policy and the North American Free Trade Agreement on Trade in North American Sugar Containing Products

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1 Impacts of U.S. Sugar Polcy and the North Amercan Free Trade Agreement on Trade n North Amercan Sugar ontanng Products Ross Prutt Danel S. Tlley* Selected Paper prepared for Presentaton at the Amercan Agrcultural Economcs Assocaton Annual eetng Long Beach, alforna, July -6, 006 opyrght 006 by Ross Prutt and Danel S. Tlley. All rghts reserved. Readers may make verbatm copes of ths document for non-commercal purposes by any means, provded that ths copyrght notce appears on all such copes. * Graduate Research Assstant and Professor, Department of Agrcultural Economcs, Oklahoma State Unversty, Stllwater, Oklahoma. ontact: Ross Prutt, Oklahoma State Unversty, Dept. of Agrcultural Economcs, 41H Agrcultural Hall. Stllwater, OK 74078, Phone: (405) , Fax: (405) , e-mal: ross.prutt@okstate.edu.

2 Impacts of U.S. Sugar Polcy and the North Amercan Free Trade Agreement on Trade n Sugar ontanng Products Producton allotments, preferental marketng agreements, tarffs, and quotas are used to protect sweetener markets. In the Unted States, the prce of raw sugar s augmented by a system of prce supports whch are feasble due to the quotas and producton allotments. These prce supports stem from federally allocated domestc allotments to U.S. sugar beet and sugarcane producers whle guaranteeng to the maxmum extent possble the supports operate at no cost to the federal government (Haley and Suarez 00). Prce floors n place for U.S. producers of sugarcane and sugar beets not only guarantee a mnmum prce of 18 and.9 cents, respectvely, for sugarcane and sugar beets, but lead to hgher costs for manufacturers of sugar contanng products n the U.S. These prce floors rase the prce of sugar n the U.S. to approxmately twce the world prce of raw sugar and four tmes the world prce for refned sugar. Hgher sweetener prces make t more dffcult for confectonery manufacturng plants n the U.S. to compete wth plants n anada and exco. A few non-emprcal artcles (Jusko, 00; Napoltano, 004) have focused, n part, on why these companes choose to ether close ther doors or relocate to avod the hgher costs of sweeteners n the U.S. A recent publcaton by the Department of ommerce s Internatonal Trade Admnstraton (006) states that for every one ob saved n the growng and harvestng of sugar costs the naton approxmately three obs n confectonery manufacturng. Due to the artfcally hgh prce of U.S. sugar, theory would suggest that domestc manufacturers of products wth hgh sugar content would relocate to markets where sugar can be obtaned at the lower world prce or change to a cheaper, substtutable

3 nput (such as hgh fructose corn syrup n the carbonated beverage market). As a result, trade of sugar contanng products n North Amerca would shft due to the polcynduced comparatve advantage. Ths paper presents a game theoretcal ournot model to llustrate how trade n sugar contanng products and the locaton of sugar contanng product manufacturers n North Amerca s mpacted by the combned effects of domestc U.S. sugar polcy and the North Amercan Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Ths paper develops the mplcatons of the current sugar polces of the three countres nvolved n NAFTA. Lterature Revew The U.S. has a long hstory of protectng ts sugar ndustry datng back to shortly after the Revolutonary War. Only approxmately the past thrty years of U.S. sugar polcy are shown n table 1. The Jones-ostgan Act of 194 lad the framework for sugar polcy n place today. These polcy provsons nclude (1) an annual determnaton of U.S. domestc requrements for sugar; () the dvson of the U.S. sugar market among domestc and foregn supplers va the use of quotas; () the allotment of quotas among processors of sugar n domestc areas (.e. marketng allotments); and (4) the adustment of cane and beet producton n each area to the establshed quotas (.e. acreage allotments), (U.S. Internatonal Trade ommsson 001). The basc obectves of the Jones-ostgan Act of 194 (as denoted by the Sugar Act of 1948 n table 1) remaned n place untl 1974 (U.S. Internatonal Trade ommsson 001; Alvarez and Polopolus 00). Hgh prces for sugar that prevaled at the tme of the expraton of the Sugar Act of 1948 soon dsappeared leadng to the renstatement of prce support programs n nor changes n sugar polcy occurred from 1977 untl

4 the present day, wth most of the changes due to nternatonal agreements that the U.S. negotated. urrent U.S. sugar polcy guarantees sugar cane producers a mnmum of 18 cents per pound and sugar beet producers a mnmum of.9 cents per pound, whch s two to three tmes hgher than the world prce for sugar (see fgure 1). Upon refnement of the sugar, the prce of sugar n the U.S. s nearly quadruple the world prce of refned sugar (see fgure ). Durng the 1970s the process of extractng hgh fructose corn syrup (HFS) from cornstarch became relable enough for ndustral purposes (Severson 004). hanges n sugar polcy durng ths tme perod (as noted n table 1) led to HFS replacng sugar n many products ncludng carbonated soft drnks. Snce ths tme, delveres of hgh fructose corn syrup have steadly been growng to the pont that U.S. resdents consume more HFS each year than sugar (Haley et al. 005) and at a cheaper prce than sugar, approxmately fourteen cents per pound durng the 005 calendar year (DA ERS 005). The total volume of U.S. corn producton n a gven year leads to corn sweeteners substtutng for sugar n many products partally because of the lower prce. Sugar producton n exco s also hghly regulated leadng to a prce receved by producers that s approxmately two and a half tmes the world prce for raw sugar. However, the prce of excan refned sugar s roughly three cents per pound greater than the excan prce of raw sugar. Ths prce dfferental s also the same for world prced refned and raw sugar. anada s the only North Amercan country that does not protect ts domestc sugar beet producers and has no mport restrctons on raw sugar and mnmal tarffs on refned sugar. oncerns from U.S. and excan sugar contanng 4

5 product manufacturers ablty to reman compettve n export markets led to programs n each respectve naton that allow manufacturers to mport world prced sugar for use n products ntended for export. These concerns stem from the fact that any products made n the U.S. and exco that are destned for the local markets must be made wth domestc sugar purchased at the augmented prce. Duty free access s granted to the U.S. sugar markets to exco and anada through the North Amercan Free Trade Agreement wth full mplementaton of the agreement to occur n 008. Begnnng n 008, exco wll have free and unlmted export access to the U.S. sugar market. urrently, there s stll debate over the nterpretaton of the U.S. and excan agreement regardng the amount of surplus domestc sugar exco can export to the U.S. pror to 008. The debate revolves around whether or not the agreement ncludes hgh fructose corn syrup as part of net surplus producton of sweeteners. Pror to full mplementaton of NAFTA, once excan exports of sugar to the U.S. have reached ther agreed upon level, then the duty as shown n table wll be charged. However, as Haley (00) notes, more sugar currently enters the U.S. than s explctly agreed due to the fact that tarff classfcatons do not take nto account the sugar contaned n manufactured products. Tarffs on mported sugar contanng products are governed by hapters 17, 18, 19, and 1 of the U.S. Harmonzed Tarff Schedule. Tarff rates for anada and exco are non-exstent on the maorty of tems lsted n these chapters wth the remanng tems havng ether no tarff n place or an ad valorem tarff rangng from three and a half percent to seventeen and a half percent dependng on the product beng mported (Haley 00). 5

6 Because the prce of domestc sugar n the U.S. s above the world sugar prce, some government programs seek to remedy the dsadvantage caused for domestc sugarusng manufacturers. The Sugar-ontanng Products Re-Export Program (SPREP) allows for the purchase of sugar at the world prce to be mported nto the U.S. for the purpose of processng the sugar nto any number of goods that wll be exported. Furthermore, the North Amercan Free Trade Agreement allows duty free access to the sugar confectonery markets of NAFTA countres. urrently, domestc excan polcy ensures that excan sugar producers also receve a prce for ther sugar above the world prce. Lke the U.S., ths rases the prce excan sugar-contanng manufacturers pay for sugar. However, the Program of Temporary Importaton for Producng Artcles of Exportaton (PITEX) and aqula Export Program allow excan manufacturers to mport sugar at the world prce for use n makng products ntended for export. The report publshed by the Internatonal Trade Admnstraton (006) states that excan sugar prces are approxmately two-thrds of the prce of refned sugar n the U.S. whle anadan prces are approxmately half the U.S. prce for sugar. Any complete dscusson of trade n sugar contanng products can not gnore the mpact that sweeteners derved from corn have affected consumer products wth HFS beng the type of corn sweetener often found n products. orn derved sweeteners can be found n products such as carbonated beverages to frozen foods to dnner rolls. One 1 ounce can of oca-ola contans the DA daly allowance of sugar (n HFS form) (Severson 004). The possblty of ncreased use of ethanol derved from corn to help offset hgher petroleum prces wll contnue to ensure that abundant sources of corn 6

7 wll be avalable for U.S. food processors to obtan HFS. Ethanol derved from sugar s also a possblty that would alter sweetener delveres to sugar confectonery manufacturers. However, untl sugar costs less than corn-based sweeteners, U.S. food manufacturers wll be reluctant to ncrease sugar purchases for use n producton and as long as cheaper sweeteners are avalable. Although the Internatonal Trade Admnstraton (006) report states that three (sugar) confectonery manufacturng obs are lost due to the hgh U.S. sugar prces, the reports does not appear to take nto account the number of ncreased obs n the processng of corn nto HFS. The transton to HFS as the predomnant sweetener consumed may be occurrng n exco (Sano, House, and Spreen 004). Transton to the use of HFS n exco s occurrng even though the excan sugar ndustry s attemptng to lmt adopton of HFS through a twenty percent usage tax whch has recently been deemed aganst World Trade Organzaton rules (TR 005b). In addton, the corn-based sweeteners are versatle and tend to keep foods soft (Severson 004). uch research has been focused on the effects of governmental nterventon on nternatonal trade (Brander and Spencer 1985; Paarlberg and Abbott 1998; Paarlberg 1995). Elobed and Beghn (005) and Paarlberg (1995) n ther analyses of the sugar and wheat markets, respectvely, use a partal equlbrum model. Paarlberg explores the effects of an export subsdy on wheat specfcally n the trade of ntermedate goods n a two country model. Elobed and Beghn (005) analyze the changes n world-wde sugar producton and consumpton under complete trade lberalzaton and consder elmnaton of consumpton dstortons through the use of consumer subsdes. The General Accountng Offce (GAO 000) measured changes n welfare from a lberalzaton of 7

8 only the U.S. sugar polcy and found that ths would result n nearly a bllon dollar gan to the U.S. economy over an unspecfed length of tme. The Hecksher-Ohln-Samuelson model of nternatonal trade demonstrates a country wll produce goods for trade for whch t possesses a comparatve advantage. Furthermore, trade n ths model wll only occur between countres that dffer n terms of endowments and technologes, but emprcal evdence ponts to the fact that ths model does not hold true (Berman and Fernandez, 1998). Ths model of nternatonal trade and avalable data can be reconcled by relaxng ether the assumpton of perfectly compettve markets or no ncreasng returns to scale n the producton of the good (Berman and Fernandez, 1998). Due to the degree of processng that occurs n sugar contanng products, the commodty nature of sugar s lost. For example, a Butterfnger candy bar s not the same as a Snckers candy bar. The dfferentated nature of these branded products leads to dfferent demand curves beng faced by the frm that makes each of these candy bars mplyng that these goods are substtutes. Relaxng the assumpton of perfectly compettve markets s one step to ad n brngng the Hecksher- Ohln-Samuelson model nto agreement wth emprcal evdence. Emprcal evdence on nternatonal trade, as ponted out by Berman and Fernandez (1998), s domnated by a few countres that have smlar resource endowments and subsequently trade smlar goods wth other lke countres. Sngh and Vves (1984) model ournot and Bertrand equlbra n a dfferentated duopoly where the goods can be substtutes or complements. The advantage of a ournot olgopoly s the fact that frms smultaneously set quantty to be produced wthout regards to any other frm s output. 8

9 ournot odel A three country model (anada, exco, and the U.S.) s presented wth one sugar confectonery manufacturer n each country. These three countres are used n the model due to the ncorporaton of NAFTA nto the model. As mentoned earler, the assumpton of perfectly compettve markets n the neoclasscal trade model s relaxed and each manufacturer s assumed to sell a branded product n the markets of each country. Total quantty of sugar products n the U.S. s Q q q = q (1) where q s the quantty of sugar confectonery products avalable n the U.S. produced by frm owned n country (where refers to the U.S., represents anada, and s for exco) wth producton facltes located n country. Ths equaton can also be changed to represent the quantty of sugar contanng products n anada or exco. Each frm chooses the level of output to produce. The nverse demand for sugar confectonery products n the U.S. market s P β = aρ Q whch after substtutng equaton (1) n for Q becomes P = a β q β q β q ) () ρ ( 1 where s the natonalty of the frm and refers to the factory locaton of the producng frm. The ntercept term, a ρ, s an ndex wth ρ takng on a value between one (representatve of the U.S. frm) and three (representatve of exco). Equaton () s adapted from the work of Sngh and Vves (1984) for the purpose of three frms based n one of the three countres partcpatng n NAFTA wth each frm producng a dfferentated product. Sngh and Vves (1984) note that f the value of the β s are equal along wth the respectve values of a ρ, then consumers n country vew each frm s 9

10 products as perfect substtutes. Smlarly, the nverse demand equatons for sugar confectonery markets n anada and exco s P P = c τ q τ q τ q ) () ρ ( 1 = d ν q ν q ν q ). (4) ρ ( 1 Sugar s converted nto confectonery n fxed proportons n each country, that s q = λx, where λ represents the technologcal coeffcent that converts the amount of sugar, x, to ts confectonery equvalent, q, by the th frm n the th country. Producton technologes are assumed to be constant across all three NAFTA countres. The resultng cost functons for each frm are gven by = ( ω ) q θ (5) where ω s the world prce of (refned) sugar, s the labor cost, s the cost of utltes assocated wth producng the confectonery good n country by frm, and θ are the fxed costs of producton. Each frm s a prce taker n the nput markets regardless of the country that the frm locates ts producton faclty. The cost functon exhbts constant returns to scale for each frm whch may lead to a proft maxmzng soluton not exstng. onstant return to scales s also exhbted n the producton functon and therefore s homogenous of degree one whch leads to the margnal cost, average varable cost, and average cost beng dentcal for the frm snce costs are lnear n output. urrent sugar polcy n the U.S. rases the effectve prce of sugar to approxmately four tmes the world market prce for refned sugar. Adustng for ths fact changes the cost structure of the U.S. frm and s shown n ts proft functon for ts domestc market 10

11 π = 1 q )) q (4ω ) q θ (6) ( a ( β1q β q β where the superscrpt refers to the locaton of the manufacturng faclty whch may be located n any of the North Amercan countres to obtan sugar at ts lowest possble prce. For excan products enterng the U.S. (or anada), the frm would be located n exco due to the presence of PITEX and the aqula Export Program whch allows for the purchase of world prced sugar. Due to anadan sugar polcy, anada sugar contanng manufacturers are able to purchase sugar at the world prce regardless of whether the fnal product s destned for exco, the U.S. or ts domestc market. The domestc proft functon for the anadan frm s π = 1 q )) q ( ω ) q θ. (7) ( c ( τ 1q τ q τ The effectve excan prce for sugar s two and a half tmes the world prce for sugar and s reflected n ts proft functon for the excan frm n ts domestc market π = q )) q (.5ω ) q θ. (8) ( d ( ν 1q ν q ν However, the exportng th frm s proft functon s altered only n the cost functon so that t s the same as equaton (5) due to the Sugar ontanng Products Re- Export Program (n the U.S.), PITEX polcy nterventons n the prce of sugar (exco), or no sugar prce protectonst polces (anada). By dfferentatng equaton (6) for the U.S. based frm and the correspondng proft functons for the anadan and excan frms wth respect to own quantty and solvng smultaneously for q, the response functons for each frm n the U.S. market are calculated and shown n the equatons below q a a a 10ω 1 =, (9) 4β1 11

12 1 1 4 β ω a a a q =, (10) and 1 4 β ω a a a q =, (11) the resultng prce for the U.S. frm s then 4 1 a a a P ω =. (1) Smlar prces are obtaned for the other two North Amercan frms n the U.S. market wth the dfferences occurrng n the sgn and magntude of a ρ (ths statement holds true n the prce determnaton for the other two North Amercan markets). It s nterestng to note that the exportng frms to the U.S. market are postvely benefted by the world prce of refned sugar whereas the U.S. frm s producton levels are negatvely mpacted by the U.S. sugar prce gvng frms an ncentve to locate outsde the U.S. to acheve the ablty to purchase sugar at ts lowest possble prce. A smlar stuaton occurs n the anadan market by dfferentatng equaton (7) and the correspondng proft functons for the U.S. and excan frms and solvng smultaneously for q. The response functons for each frm n the anadan market are τ ω c c c q =, (1) 1 4 τ ω c c c q =, (14) and 1 4 τ ω c c c q =, (15)

13 wth the prce for the U.S. frm n the anadan market beng P ω c1 c c =. (16) 4 The anadan market clearly demonstrates what occurs n producton of sugar confectonery when no protectonst sugar polces are n place. The reader wll remember that the order and sgn of c ρ are the only dfferences observed n prces across all three frms. Fnally, the quantty produced by each frm n the excan market s shown below after dfferentatng the proft equaton for each frm wth respect to own q : q d d d.5ω 1 =, (17) 4ν 1 q d d d.5ω 1 =, (18) 4ν and q d d d 5.5ω 1 = (19) 4ν wth the prce of the U.S. frm n the excan market represented by P d1 d d = 1.15ω. (0) 4 The observant reader wll have notced that the lower the wage (utlty) level n a gven country relatve to the other countres n the model wll result n larger quanttes of confectonery beng produced n that country. Ths s not surprsng due to anecdotal evdence provded by Jusko (00) and Napoltano (004). The reverse of the prevous statement also holds true, whch would be a detrment to sugar confectonery manufacturers n the Unted States. Elmnaton of current U.S. sugar prce supports 1

14 would result n a stuaton smlar to the current anadan market allowng U.S. sugar confectonery manufacturers to be more compettve n ther own market. Ths would help to stem the tde of ths sector of the U.S. economy downszng or choosng to relocate across the border. After full mplementaton of NAFTA n 008, few changes may occur n the current locaton of sugar confectonery markets as long as the sugar polcy dstortons that created ths stuaton are stll n place. By elmnatng the re-export programs of the U.S. and exco for sugar contanng products along wth ther domestc sugar polcy whch sets a prce floor, more notceable changes n locaton of sugar confectonery manufacturers may occur. Furthermore, wdespread producton of ethanol n the U.S. may lead to the prce of HFS ncreasng to the pont that whatever advantage frms possess by usng HFS s eroded. Subsequently, ths may lead to a further exodus of sugar confectonery manufacturers leavng the U.S. onclusons Sugar has hstorcally been one of the most subsdzed commodtes not only n the U.S. but also n many of the man sugar producng countres. Preferental agreements and quotas domnate the polcy of maor sugar producng countres that beneft producers of sugar beets and sugarcane. However, ths puts sugar confectonery manufacturers at a dsadvantage to countres that do not protect ther domestc sugar producers. Ths paper has sought to develop a smple, game theoretcal model that demonstrates the nature of sugar confectonery trade flows n North Amerca due to the falure of the theory of comparatve advantage. 14

15 Results from the theoretcal model demonstrate that the quantty of trade flows s affected due to the current nature of polcy regardng sugar n North Amerca. Frms n the U.S. and exco have taken advantage of programs such as the SPREP and the aqula Export Program that allow these frms to reman compettve n foregn markets. However, due to polcy restrctons n the U.S. and exco, products produced nternally for ther respectve domestc markets must be produced wth domestcally purchased sugar. anada has no such polcy whch nherently places ther sugar confectonery manufacturers at a dstnct dsadvantage. The model presented n ths paper demonstrates that t would be advantageous for frms to take advantage of the export ncentve programs of each country and not produce products for the domestc market. It s possble that frms would locate n areas that border the mportng country to mnmze transportaton costs. For example, Texas could become the locale for many sugar confectoners due to ts proxmty to exco. The same would hold true for the state of hhuahua n exco due to ts proxmty to large markets n the southern and western parts of the U.S. Ths paper analyzed the presence of one frm n each of the three North Amercan countres and the prces each frm would receve. Addtonal frms n each country would affect not only prce and quantty produced n each country, but also profts. 15

16 omparson of Raw Sugar Prces $0.0 Prce n dollars per pound $0.5 $0.0 $0.15 $0.10 $0.05 exco U.S. World $- Jan-0 Apr-0 Jul-0 Oct-0 Jan-0 Apr-0 Jul-0 Oct-0 Jan-04 Apr-04 Jul-04 Oct-04 Jan-05 onth Fgure 1, omparson of Raw Sugar Prces n the U.S., exco, and World, January 00 through arch 005. Sources: Flores, Flores and Hernandez, DA ERS. 16

17 omparson of Refned Sugar Prces Prce n dollars per pound $0.50 $0.45 $0.40 $0.5 $0.0 $0.5 $0.0 $0.15 $0.10 $0.05 $- Jan-0 Apr-0 Jul-0 Oct-0 Jan-0 Apr-0 Jul-0 Oct-0 onth Jan-04 Apr-04 Jul-04 Oct-04 Jan-05 exco U.S. World Fgure, omparson of Refned Sugar Prces n exco, the U.S. and World, January 00 through arch 005. Sources: Flores, Flores and Hernandez, DA ERS 17

18 Table 1, hanges n Sugar Polcy Snce Year hange 1974 Expraton of Sugar Act of 1948; elmnaton of drect payments; global quota of seven mllon tons at current duty rates; unrestrcted domestc producton 1977 Food and Agrculture Act of 1977; establshed loan rates for ommodty redt orporaton () 1981 Agrculture and Food Act of 1981; prce support programs for crop years; mport dutes ncreased and country by country mport quotas establshed 1985 Food Securty Act of 1985; contnued programs from 1981 act; sugar program to act at no cost to federal government through domestc producton quotas 1990 Food, Agrculture, onservaton, and Trade Act of 1990; mnmum mport quota of 1.5 mllon short tons under two-tered tarff scheme 1994 North Amercan Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) takes effect 1996 Federal Agrcultural Improvement and Reform Act; recourse loans when mports less than 1.5 mllon tons 00 Farm Securty and Rural Investment Act; termnated processors forfeture penaltes to the government; marketng allotments suspended f mports exceed 1.5 mllon tons, raw value 005 entral Amercan Free Trade Agreement sgned 008 NAFTA fully mplemented Source: Alvarez and Polopolus, U.S. Internatonal Trade ommsson. 18

19 Table. Hgh-Ter 1 Tarffs on U.S. Sugar Imports from exco base and annually 1995 through 008 (full mplementaton of NAFTA). Year Raw ane Refned Sugar per pound Base Source: Haley and Suarez (1999) 1 Hgh-Ter tarff refers to U.S. sugar mports exceedng a predetermned value and subect to a hgher tarff rate where the lower tarff rate s zero. 19

20 Works ted Alvarez, J. and L.. Polopolus. 00. The Hstory of U.S. Sugar Protecton. S 019, Insttute of Food and Agrcultural Scences, Unversty of Florda. Berman, H.S. and L. Fernandez Game Theory wth Economc Applcatons, nd ed. New York: Addson-Wesley. Brander, J.A. and B.J. Spencer Export Subsdes and Internatonal arket Share Rvalry. Journal of Internatonal Economcs. 18: Elobed, A. and J. Beghn ultlateral Trade and Agrcultural Polcy Reforms n Sugar arkets. Workng Paper 04-WP 56, enter for Agrcultural and Rural Development, Iowa State Unversty. Flores, D excan Sugar Annual. Washngton D: U.S. Department of Agrculture, Foregn Agrcultural Servce GAIN Rep. X507, arch. Flores, D. and G. Hernandez. 00. excan Sugar Annual. Washngton D: U.S. Department of Agrculture, Foregn Agrcultural Servce GAIN Rep. X046, Aprl. General Accountng Offce Sugar Program: Supportng Sugar Prces Has Increased Users osts Whle Beneftng Producers. GAO/RED Washngton D, June. Haley, S. 00. easurng the Effect of Imports of Sugar-ontanng Products on U.S. Sugar Delveres. Washngton D: U.S. Department of Agrculture, Economcs Research Servce SSS-7-01, September. Haley, S Sugar and Sweeteners: Background. Accessed on December 0, 005. Haley, S. and N.R. Suarez Agrcultural Outlook U.S.-exco Sweetener Trade red n Dspute. June 8, 005. Haley, S. and N.R. Suarez. 00. Sugar and Sweeteners Outlook. Washngton D: U.S. Department of Agrculture, Economc Research Servce SSS-5, September. Haley, S., J. Reed, B. Ln, and A. ook Sweetener onsumpton n the Unted States. Washngton D: U.S. Department of Agrculture, Economc Research Servce SSS-4-01, August. 0

21 Jusko, J. 00. Btter Goodbye. July. Accessed on September 9, 005. Napoltano, J hcago to Lose Two Hstorc andy Brands. New York Tmes. January 0, page A14. Paarlberg, P.A Agrcultural Export Subsdes and Intermedate Goods Trade. Amercan Journal of Agrcultural Economcs. 77: Paarlberg, P.A. and P.. Abbot Olgopolstc Behavor by Publc Agences n Internatonal Trade: The World Wheat arket. Amercan Journal of Agrcultural Economcs. 68:58-4. Sano, D., L.A. House, and T.H. Spreen Analyss of the U.S.-exco Sugar Trade 10 years of NAFTA Regme and 10 Years From Now. Paper presented at AAEA annual meetng, Denver O, 1-4 August. Severson, K Sugar coated: We re drownng n hgh fructose corn syrup. Do the rsks go beyond our wastlne? San Francsco hroncle. February 18, page E1. Sngh, N. and X. Vves Prce and quantty competton n a dfferentated duopoly. Rand Journal of Economcs. 15: U.S. Department of Agrculture, Economc Research Servce (ERS) and Sweeteners: Data Tables and 4. Accessed on January 0, 005. U.S. Department of Agrculture, Foregn Agrcultural Servce (FAS) World arket Profle for onfectonery Products. df. Accessed on November 1, 005. U.S. Department of ommerce, Internatonal Trade Admnstraton Employment hanges n U.S. Food anufacturng: The Impact of Sugar Prces. Washngton D, February 14. U.S. Internatonal Trade ommsson Industry and Trade Summary: Sugar. Washngton D, arch. U.S. Trade Representatve (TR). 005a. Sugar: A Spoonful a Week. February. U.S. Trade Representatve. 005b. U.S. Wns exco Beverage Tax Dspute. exco_beverage_tax_dspute.html. Accessed on February 0,