November K. J. Martijn Cremers Lubomir P. Litov Simone M. Sepe

Transcription

1 ONLINE APPENDIX TABLES OF STAGGERED BOARDS AND LONG-TERM FIRM VALUE, REVISITED November 016 K. J. Martijn Cremers Lubomir P. Litov Simone M. Sepe The paper itself is available at University of Notre Dame, Mendoza College of Business. address: Corresponding author, phone: The University of Oklahoma, Price College of Business and the College of Law and Wharton Financial Institutions Center, University of Pennsylvania. address: University of Chicago Law School and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse Fondation Jean-Jacques Laffont Toulouse School of Economics. address: 1

2 APPENDIX TABLE A.1: CORRELATIONS OF KEY DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES Table A.1 shows Pearson pairwise correlations with p-values between parentheses. Variable descriptions are given in Table 1. Q Staggered Board Staggered Board- Charter Staggered Board- Bylaws Ln (Assets) Delaware Incorp. ROA CAPX /Assets R&D / Sales Staggered Board (0.00) Staggered Board Charter (0.00) (0.00) Staggered Board Bylaws (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Ln (Assets) (0.00) (0.00) (0.1) (0.00) Delaware Incorporation (0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) ROA (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) CAPX/Assets (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) R&D/ Sales (0.00) (0.00) (0.1) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Industry M&A (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.1) (0.91) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)

3 APPENDIX TABLE A., PANEL A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MAIN DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR FIRMS WITHOUT A STAGGERED BOARD Table A., Panel A presents sample descriptive statistics for the main dependent and independent variables, as well as the interacted variables for firm-year observations for the sample of firms without a staggered board. All continuous variables are winsorized at.5% in both tails. Dependent Variables: Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs. Q [t] ,398 Independent Variables: Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs. CAPX/Assets [t] ,398 Delaware Incorporation [t] ,398 G-Index (minus staggered board) [t] ,538 Insider Ownership [t] ,74 Ln (Age) [t] Ln (Assets) [t] ,398 Industry M&A Volume [t] ,398 R&D/Sales [t] ,398 ROA [t] ,398 Staggered Board [t] ,398 Interacted Variables: Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs. Institutional Holding Duration [t] ,81 Percent Transient Institutions [t] ,857 Ln(Intangible / Total Assets [t]) ,5 Ranked Patent Citation Count [t] ,155 Firm Sales [t] ,390 Research Quotient [t] ,170 Contract Specificity [t] ,791 Labor Productivity [t] ,918 Large Customer 10% [t] ,604 Strategic Alliance [t] ,950 3

4 APPENDIX TABLE A., PANEL B: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MAIN DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR FIRMS WITH A STAGGERED BOARD Table A., Panel B presents sample descriptive statistics for the main dependent and independent variables, as well as the interacted variables for firm-year observations for firms with a staggered board. All continuous variables are winsorized at.5% in both tails. Dependent Variables: Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs. Q [t] ,078 Independent Variables: Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs. CAPX/Assets [t] ,078 Delaware Incorporation [t] ,078 G-Index (minus staggered board) [t] ,987 Insider Ownership [t] ,474 Ln (Age) [t] Ln (Assets) [t] ,078 Industry M&A Volume [t] ,078 R&D/Sales [t] ,078 ROA [t] ,078 Staggered Board [t] ,078 Interacted Variables: Mean Median St. Dev. Min Max Obs. Institutional Holding Duration [t] ,650 Percent Transient Institutions [t] ,985 Ln(Intangible / Total Assets [t]) ,977 Ranked Patent Citation Count [t] ,63 Firm Sales [t] ,070 Research Quotient [t] ,677 Contract Specificity [t] ,687 Labor Productivity [t] ,797 Large Customer 10% [t] ,503 Strategic Alliance [t] ,83 4

5 APPENDIX TABLE A.3: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS BETWEEN-FIRMS ESTIMATORS Table A.3 presents the between-firms estimator (i.e., exploiting cross-sectional variation only and ignoring time series variation within firms) of the Staggered Board coefficient in annual pooled panel Q regressions on Staggered Board with year dummies and the following control variables: Staggered Board [t-1], Ln (Assets) [t-1], Delaware Incorporation [t-1], ROA [t-1], CAPX/Assets [t-1], R&D/Sales [t-1], and Industry M&A Volume [t-1]. The analysis includes the following sub-periods: , , and All variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. The table also reports the panel standard deviation decomposition for Q in its cross-sectional (between firms) and time series (within firms) dimensions. Dep. Variable: Q [t] Variables (1) () (3) Period: Between-estimator Staggered Board [t-1] ** ** (.0) (1.57) (.17) Number of firms 3,076 1,581,415 R Panel Standard Deviation Decomposition for Q [t] Overall Between Within

6 APPENDIX TABLE A.4: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: ROBUSTNESS Table A.4 first shows a replication of Bebchuk and Cohen (005), using their sample period of , with additional control variables in the regression for columns (1) and (): G-Index [t-1], Ln (Firm Age) [t-1], Insider Ownership [t-1], and Insider Ownership [t-1]. The regression for column (1) includes year and industry (4-digit SIC code) fixed effects, and for column () includes year and firm fixed effects. In the regression for column (3), we also control for the lagged dependent variable, Q [t-1], including both standard controls and additional controls, as well as year and 4-digit SIC industry fixed effects and using the period The regressions for columns (4) and (5) include the set of standard controls and and , respectively, with year and firm fixed effects. Finally, in the regression for column (6), we consider the full time period, , with 4-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects, and also control for the lagged dependent variable, Q [t-1]. All control variables are defined in Table 1. T- statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. (1) () (3) (4) (5) (6) Period: Q [t-1] *** *** (3.71) (98.55) Staggered Board [t-1] * ** (1.17) (1.8) (0.87) (1.1) (.1) (1.39) G-Index [t-1] (0.57) (0.33) (0.06) Ln (Assets) [t-1] 0.05 *** *** ** *** *** (3.4) (8.10) (.7) (4.05) (14.9) (1.57) Ln (Firm Age) [t-1] (1.34) (1.59) (0.5) Delaware Incorporation [t-1] (0.8) (1.7) (0.13) - (1.09) (0.8) Insider Ownership [t-1] (0.95) (1.06) (1.01) Insider Ownership [t-1] *** (0.37) (7.74) (0.04) ROA [t-1] *** ** 1.05 *** *** 3.36 *** *** (19.11) (.19) (5.74) (8.71) (0.76) (10.04) CAPX/Assets [t-1] ** *** *** (.17) (0.35) (3.04) (0.59) (0.53) (5.53) R&D/ Sales [t-1] *** *** *** (7.17) (0.93) (3.70) (0.43) (1.5) (5.73) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] *** ** (0.85) (0.33) (1.11) (1.38) (3.57) (.30) N 5,53 5,53 5,53 6,054 8,4 31,195 Adjusted R-Squared Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Firm Effect No Yes No Yes Yes No Industry Effect Yes No Yes No No Yes

7 APPENDIX TABLE A.5: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: ROBUSTNESS, INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS Table A.5 first shows a replication of Bebchuk and Cohen (005), using their sample period of , with additional control variables: G-Index [t-1], Ln (Firm Age) [t-1], Insider Ownership [t-1], and Insider Ownership [t-1] and using different industry fixed effects (-digit SIC code, 3-digit SIC code and Fama- French 49 industries, FF 49 ). In columns (4)-(6), we also control for the lagged dependent variable, Q [t-1]. All control variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. Period: (1) () (3) (4) (5) (6) Q [t-1] *** *** 0.75 *** (44.6) (36.9) (44.7) Staggered Board [t-1] ** ** (1.18) (.1) (.17) (0.8) (1.43) (1.30) G-Index [t-1] *** * *** (.8) (1.90) (.97) (0.90) (0.68) (0.70) Ln (Assets) [t-1] *** *** 0.07 *** * 0.00 (4.7) (5.13) (.88) (1.18) (1.73) (0.34) Ln (Firm Age) [t-1] ** ** (.53) (1.43) (.37) (0.35) (0.5) (0.40) Delaware Incorporation [t-1] (0.49) (0.58) (0.68) (0.0) (0.) (0.16) Insider Ownership [t-1] (0.1) (0.58) (0.33) (0.11) (0.46) (0.35) Insider Ownership [t-1] (1.01) (0.17) (0.66) (0.96) (0.15) (1.05) ROA [t-1] *** *** *** *** *** *** (34.4) (9.30) (33.98) (4.94) (5.09) (4.98) CAPX/Assets [t-1] *** *** -1.1 *** ** *** * (4.35) (3.8) (4.04) (.18) (.67) (1.94) R&D/ Sales [t-1] 6.68 *** *** 5.61 *** *** *** 1.98 *** (18.8) (13.15) (13.9) (5.43) (4.54) (3.95) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] (0.6) (0.69) (0.93) (0.14) (0.77) (1.0) N 5,53 5,53 5,14 5,36 5,36 5,197 Adjusted R-Squared Year Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Industry -digit SIC 3-digit SIC FF 49 -digit SIC 3-digit SIC FF 49

8 APPENDIX TABLE A.6: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: ROBUSTNESS, REDUCED SAMPLES Table A.6 presents annual pooled panel Q regressions on Staggered Board with firm fixed effects. All specifications include year dummies and the following control variables: Staggered Board [t-1], Ln (Assets) [t- 1], Delaware Incorporation [t-1], ROA [t-1], CAPX/Assets [t-1], R&D/ Sales [t-1], and Industry M&A Volume [t-1]. The analysis includes the following sub-periods: except for in column (1); and except for in column (). Column (3) presents the baseline model with firm fixed effects (year effects omitted due to collinearity) in with the addition of higher-order fixed effects where we interact 4-digit SIC codes and year fixed effects. All variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. Dep. Variable: Q [t] Variables (1) () (3) Fixed Effects: Firm + Year Fixed Effects Staggered Board [t-1] * * ** (firm cluster) (1.95) (1.9) (.16) Ln (Assets) [t-1] -0. *** *** *** (13.03) (11.9) (1.73) Delaware Incorporation [t-1] (1.08) (1.31) (0.95) ROA [t-1] *** 3.01 *** 3.0 *** (0.94) (0.53) (18.48) CAPX/Assets [t-1] (0.18) (0.01) (0.8) R&D/ Sales [t-1] 1.77 ** *** (.39) (.98) (1.31) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] *** *** - (3.03) (3.19) # of firms in regression 3,063 3,07,703 N 31,566 30,777 30,569 Adj. R

9 APPENDIX TABLE A.7: PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS - ROBUSTNESS Table A.7 presents the abnormal returns of portfolios of firms that have staggered up (in the long portfolio) and firms that have destaggered (in the short portfolio). Panel A presents results for the value-weighted 6m1, 1m1, and 1m4 portfolios, while Panel B shows results for the equally-weighted returns for portfolios 18m1, 18m18, and 18m4. The long (short) portfolios are composed every month as follows. For portfolios 6m1, 1m1, and 1m4, we follow the procedure described in Table 5. For portfolio 18m1, we include all stocks of firms that have (de-)staggered their boards starting 18 months before the fiscal year-end of the year in which the firm has reported its board being (de-)staggered for the first time, and hold these stocks for 1 months. Portfolio 18m18 and 18m4 are analogously formed, except that we hold the stocks for 18 and 4 months, respectively. We use three models: the four-factor Carhart (1997) model (i.e., momentum, HML, SMB, and market return), the three-factor Fama-French model (i.e., HML, SMB, and market return), and the market model (i.e., CAPM). For each model, we present the returns to the long portfolio, short portfolio, and long minus short portfolio. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. 9

10 APPENDIX TABLE A.7, PANEL A: PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS: PORTFOLIOS (6M1, 1M1, AND 1M4), VALUE-WEIGHTED RETURNS Portfolio 6m1 Long Four-Factor Model Three-Factor Model Market Factor Model Short Short Long Short Short Long Short Short Alpha (Monthly) (0.00) (0.10) (0.66) (0.06) (0.7) (0.73) (0.0) (0.11) (0.63) Average # Firms N Adj. R-Squared Portfolio 1m1 Long Four-Factor Model Three-Factor Model Market Factor Model Short Short Long Short Short Long Short Short Alpha (Monthly) ** ** ** (0.74) (1.34) (.57) (0.55) (1.57) (.54) (0.79) (1.50) (.56) Average # Firms N Adj. R-Squared Portfolio 1m4 Long Four-Factor Model Three-Factor Model Market Factor Model Short Short Long Short Short Long Short Short Alpha (Monthly) (0.01) (0.75) (0.50) (0.14) (0.56) (0.19) (0.15) (0.66) (0.35) Average # Firms N Adj. R-Squared

11 APPENDIX TABLE A.7, PANEL B: PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS: ADDITIONAL PORTFOLIOS (18M1, 18M18, AND 18M4), EQUALLY-WEIGHTED RETURNS Portfolio 18m1 Long Four-Factor Model Three-Factor Model Market Factor Model Short Short Long Short Short Long Short Short Alpha (Monthly) (1.41) (0.5) (0.59) (0.87) (0.08) (0.6) (1.47) (0.56) (0.70) Average # Firms N Adj. R-Squared Portfolio 18m18 Long Four-Factor Model Three-Factor Model Market Factor Model Short Short Long Short Short Long Short Short Alpha (Monthly) * (1.47) (0.45) (0.99) (1.03) (0.4) (1.18) (1.77) (0.38) (1.5) Average # Firms N Adj. R-Squared Portfolio 18m4 Long Four-Factor Model Three-Factor Model Market Factor Model Short Short Long Short Short Long Short Short Alpha (Monthly) ** (1.57) (1.6) (0.49) (1.05) (0.63) (0.64) (.17) (1.39) (0.90) Average # Firms N Adj. R-Squared

12 APPENDIX TABLE A.8: STAGGERED BOARD, THE TAKEOVER CHANNEL, AND ENTRENCHMENT Table A.8 presents the results of pooled panel Q regressions with firm and year fixed effects (as in Table 3) that include the following interactions: with the demeaned Industry M&A Volume [t-1] in column (1), with demeaned Annual M&A Volume [t-1] in column (), with Governance Index [t-1] in column (5), and with Poison Pill [t-1] in column (6). Column (3) excludes all firms that were ex-post taken over, and column (4) modifies Q with a measure that is defined by using market value of equity based on the closing price before the last year in which the firm is taken over. We do not include Annual M&A Volume [t-1] in column () as the regression includes year fixed effects. We include the following control variables: Ln (Assets) [t-1], Delaware Incorporation [t-1], ROA [t-1], CAPX/Assets [t-1], R&D/Sales [t-1], and demeaned Industry M&A Volume [t-1], which we do not show for brevity (unless a variable is being interacted with Staggered Board [t-1]). The sample period is Individual interactions vary in their availability, as noted by the observation count for each estimated column. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. Dep. Variable: Q [t] Variables (1) () (3) (4) (5) (6) Staggered Board [t-1] ** ** *** ** ** ** (.05) (.01) (.40) (.03) (.55) (.55) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] * Staggered Board [t-1] (0.09) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] -0.4 ** (.30) Annual M&A Volume [t-1] * Staggered Board [t-1] (0.55) G-Index [t-1] Poison Pill [t-1] ** (.50) G-Index [t-1] * Staggered Board [t-1] (0.90) Poison Pill [t-1] (1.04) * Staggered Board [t-1] (0.36) Table 3 Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Fixed Effects Firm, Firm, Firm, Firm, Firm, Firm, Year Year Year Year Year Year N 34,476 34,476,460 34,484 3,55 33,967 Adjusted R-Squared

13 APPENDIX TABLE A.9: STAGGERED BOARDS AND CEO TURNOVER Table A.9 reports results for logistic regressions of Forced CEO Turnover in columns (1)-(4) and CEO Turnover in columns (5)-(8). As independent variables we include: Staggered Board [t], Excess Returns [t-1], and their interaction, controlling for Majority of Independent Directors [t], CEO-Chairman Duality [t], Insider Ownership [t], Poison Pill [t], Delaware Incorporation [t], and Board Size [t] following the list of control variables in Faleye (007). All variables are defined in Table 1. We present estimates of marginal effects. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, in two tailed tests. Pr (Forced CEO Turnover [t]) Pr (CEO Turnover [t]) (1) () (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Staggered Board [t] (0.49) (0.6) (0.83) (1.6) (0.) (0.) (0.33) (0.41) Excess Returns [t-1] -0.0 *** *** -0.0 *** *** *** *** *** *** (6.38) (3.9) (6.07) (5.09) (5.35) (3.56) (5.44) (3.3) Staggered Board [t] * Excess Returns [t-1] (0.35) (1.37) (0.05) (0.37) Majority of Independent Directors [t] (1.) (1.) (0.68) (0.71) (1.3) (1.3) (0.9) (0.89) CEO-Chairman Duality [t] (0.57) (0.55) (0.71) (0.65) (0.1) (0.1) (0.37) (0.35) Insider Ownership [t] *** *** (0.18) (0.) (3.4) (3.5) Poison Pill [t] * * (1.58) (1.58) (1.78) (1.77) (0.7) (0.7) (0.56) (0.56) Delaware Incorporation [t] (1.16) (1.16) (1.55) (1.56) (1.3) (1.3) (1.14) (1.14) Board Size [t] *** ** ** (0.96) (0.94) (0.63) (0.56) (3.93) (3.93) (.57) (.56) N 6,55 6,55 5,573 5,573 6,55 6,55 5,573 5,573 Pseudo R Number of turnover events Sample period (years)

14 APPENDIX TABLE A.10: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS: REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS WITH RANDOM PROBIT MODELS Appendix Table A.10 presents regression result for the adoption (columns (1)-(3)) and removal (columns (4)-(6)) of a staggered board as a function of the valuation of the firm (as captured by Q [t-1]) plus other characteristics. The sample for columns (4)-(6) ((1)-(3)) includes all firms that do (not) have a staggered board up until (and including) the year in which they remove (adopt) the staggered board if there is any such change, and are dropped from the sample afterwards. We use the random probit model and report the marginal effects using robust standard errors clustered at firm level. The regressions for all columns in both panels include the following control variables: Q [t-1], Ln (Assets) [t-1], Delaware Incorporation [t-1], ROA [t-1], CAPX/Assets [t-1], R&D/Sales [t-1], and Industry M&A Volume [t-1]. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are shown in parentheses below the coefficient estimates based on robust standard errors clustered by firm. All variables are defined in Table 1. Random Probit Models Random Probit Models Dep. Variable: Pr (Stagger in period t) Pr (De-stagger in period t) Variables (1) () (3) (4) (5) (6) Q [t-1] *** E E ** (.85) (0.53) (0.1) (0.46) (0.45) (.4) Ln (Assets) [t-1] E *** 1.64E *** (0.9) (1.53) (0.3) (13.45) (0.33) (1.9) Delaware Incorporation [t-1] E E (0.73) (0.61) (0.69) (1.68) (0.41) (1.35) ROA [t-1] E (0.45) (0.47) (1.16) (0.75) (0.8) (0.69) CAPX/Assets [t-1] 0.047** E (.46) (1.) (0.7) (0.73) (0.36) (0.48) R&D/ Sales [t-1] -0.05** E (.35) (0.05) (1.4) (1.56) (0.0) (1.53) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] 0.067*** 0.173*** *** *** (4.5) (3.73) (1.44) (3.4) (0.48) (4.43) N 15,661 7,376 8,406 18,739 5,938 1,801 14

15 APPENDIX TABLE A.11, PANEL A: FIRST STAGE LEVEL REGRESSIONS RESULTS FOR SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION Table A.11, Panel A shows the first stage level regression results for Staggered Board [t]. The included instruments are: Q [t-3], Staggered Board [t-3], ROA [t-3], CAPX/Assets [t-3], R&D/Sales [t-3], year fixed effects, Delaware Incorporation [t- 1], Ln (Assets) [t-1], Industry M&A Volume [t-1], Industry M&A Volume [t-1], S SSSS S AAAAAA [tt 1], S CCCCCC S AAAAAA [tt 1], S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA [tt 1], S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA [tt 1], (S SSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1], (S CCCCCC S AAAAAA ) [tt 1], (S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1], and (S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA ) [tt 1]. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. Model in Table 9: (1) () (3) (4) Q [t-3] (1.17) (1.13) (0.51) (0.47) Staggered Board [t-3] *** *** 0.51 *** 0.54 *** (1.6) (13.01) (17.47) (17.9) ROA [t-3] (0.39) (0.40) (0.10) (0.10) CAPX/Assets [t-3] (0.64) (0.64) (0.53) (0.51) R&D/ Sales [t-3] (0.06) (0.06) (0.49) (0.50) Delaware Incorporation [t-1] *** *** *** *** (6.06) (6.08) (5.36) (5.39) Ln (Assets) [t-1] *** *** *** *** (13.4) (13.09) (13.3) (13.13) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] *** *** (.86) (.86) (1.33) (1.34) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] *** 1.15 *** (3.11) (3.10) (1.35) (1.34) S SSSS S AAAAAA [tt 1] 1.07 *** 1.07 *** (35.1) (33.16) S CCCCCC S AAAAAA [tt 1] *** *** (5.66) (5.57) S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA [tt 1] (0.71) [tt 1] *** S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA (S SSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (S CCCCCC S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (13.10) *** *** (15.68) (151.8) *** *** (4.0) (4.08) ** (.5) *** (9.04) 15

16 R APPENDIX TABLE A.11, PANEL B: FIRST STAGE DIFFERENCED REGRESSIONS FOR SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION Table A.11, Panel B shows the first stage level regression for Staggered Board [t]. The included instruments are: Q [t-4], Staggered Board [t-4], ROA [t-4], CAPX/Assets [t-4], R&D/ Sales [t-4] as well as Ln(Assets) [t-1], Industry M&A Volume [t-1], Industry M&A Volume [t-1], (S SSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1], (S CCCCCC S AAAAAA ) [tt 1], (S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1], (S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA ) [tt 1], (S SSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1], (S CCCCCC S AAAAAA ) [tt 1], (S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1], and (S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA ) [tt 1]. Delaware Incorporation [t-1] is excluded due to collinearity with the intercept. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. Model in Table 8: (1) () (3) (4) Q [t-4] * * (0.10) (0.1) (1.7) (1.74) Staggered Board [t-4] -0.0 *** -0.0 *** *** *** (14.86) (14.86) (18.14) (18.16) ROA [t-4] ** ** (1.13) (1.15) (.38) (.40) CAPX/Assets [t-4] ** ** (1.4) (1.4) (.33) (.34) R&D/ Sales [t-4] (0.86) (0.85) (1.6) (1.5) Ln (Assets) [t-1] (1.5) (1.5) (1.1) (1.1) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] ** ** (.09) (.10) (0.98) (0.99) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] (0.0) (0.0) (0.7) (0.5) (S SSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (0.06) (0.08) (0.1) (0.10) ) [tt 1] *** *** (S CCCCCC S AAAAAA (S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS (S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD (S SSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (37.38) (37.36) S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (0.43) (0.44) ) [tt 1] ** S AAAAAA (S CCCCCC S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (.01) 0.03 ** (.00) *** *** (4.71) (4.71) (S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (0.) (0.0) (S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (1.60) R

17 APPENDIX TABLE A.11, PANEL C: FIRST STAGE REGRESSIONS FOR SYSTEM GMM ESTIMATION Table A.11, Panel C presents the F-statistics, their p-values, and R s of OLS first-stage regressions of levels and firstdifferenced endogenous variables on lagged differences and lagged levels respectively. The dependent (i.e., endogenous) variables are those in Table 8, system GMM estimation: Staggered Board [t], ROA [t], CAPX/Assets [t], and R&D/ Sales [t]. The results are based on a sample of,581 firms and 5,644 firm years in To obtain the Cragg-Donald statistic, we carry out two separate two-stage least squares regressions, one each for the levels and differenced equations, respectively. For the OLS regressions of levels of dependent variables in Model (1), the independent variables are: Q [t-3], Staggered Board [t-3], ROA [t-3], CAPX/Assets [t-3], R&D/ Sales [t-3], as well as year fixed effects, Delaware Incorporation [t-1], Ln (Assets) [t-1], Industry M&A Volume [t-1], Industry M&A Volume [t-1], S SSSS S AAAAAA [tt 1], and S CCCCCC S AAAAAA [tt 1]. For the OLS regressions of first-differences of dependent variables in Model (1), the independent variables are: Q [t-4], Staggered Board [t-4], ROA [t-4], CAPX/Assets [t-4], R&D/ Sales [t-4] as well as Delaware Incorporation [t- 1], Ln(Assets) [t-1], Industry M&A Volume [t-1], Industry M&A Volume [t-1], (S SSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1], and (S CCCCCC S AAAAAA ) [tt 1]. Model () adds to the instruments in Model (1) level equation S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA [tt 1] and S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA [tt 1], and it adds to the instruments in Model (1) differenced equation (S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] and (S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA ) [tt 1]. Model (3) uses the same set of instruments as used in Model (1), except for the substitution of S SSSS S AAAAAA [tt 1] and of S CCCCCC S AAAAAA [tt 1] with their squared values. Similarly, Model (4) uses the same set of instruments as Model (), except for the substitution of S SSSS S AAAAAA [tt 1], S CCCCCC S AAAAAA [tt 1], S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA [tt 1] and S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA [tt 1] with their squared values. Statistical significance of the F-statistics is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. Model in Table 8: (1) () (3) (4) F-stat. R F-stat. R F-stat. R F-stat. R Sub-Panel I: Dep. Variable in levels Staggered Board [t] 5357 *** *** *** *** 0.40 ROA [t] 77.1 *** *** *** *** 0.0 CAPX/Assets [t] *** *** *** *** 0.0 R&D/ Sales [t] *** *** *** *** 0.03 Cragg-Donald Stat Sub-Panel I: Dep. Variable is in first-differences Staggered Board [t] 656 *** *** *** *** 0.4 ROA [t] 9. *** *** *** *** 0.01 CAPX/Assets [t] *** *** *** *** 0.01 R&D/ Sales [t] 3.93 *** *** *** ***.001 Cragg-Donald Stat

18 APPENDIX TABLE A.11, PANEL D: CORRELATION OF INSTRUMENTS FOR LEVEL EQUATION FOR STAGGERED BOARD INDICATOR Table A.11, Panel D presents Pearson correlations for excluded instruments in level equation are shown below. Statistical significance of the correlation coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. The p- values are reported in parentheses. Variables Industry M&AVolume [t-1] 1 *** (0.00) S SSSS S AAAAAA [tt 1] * (0.08) 3 S CCCCCC S AAAAAA [tt 1] *** *** (0.00) (0.00) 4 S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA [tt 1] *** *** (0.57) (0.00) (0.00) 5 S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA [tt 1] *** (0.8) (0.00) (0.) (0.45) 6 (S SSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] 7 (S CCCCCC S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] 8 (S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] 9 (S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] ** *** *** *** *** (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 0.01 *** *** *** *** *** (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0) (0.00) *** *** *** *** *** (0.87) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) *** *** *** * (0.33) (0.00) (0.1) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.68) 18

19 APPENDIX TABLE A.11, PANEL E: CORRELATION OF INSTRUMENTS FOR DIFFERENCED EQUATION FOR STAGGERED BOARD INDICATOR Table A.11, Panel E presents Pearson correlations for excluded instruments in the differenced equation are shown below. Statistical significance of the correlation coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. The p-values are reported in parentheses. Variables: Industry M&A Volume [t-1] 1 *** (0.00) (S SSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (0.19) 3 (S CCCCCC S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] (0.14) (0.67) 4 (S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] ** (0.47) (0.13) (0.0) 5 (S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] *** *** (0.69) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) 6 (S SSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] 7 (S CCCCCC S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] 8 (S SSSSSSSSSSSSSS S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] 9 (S DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD S AAAAAA ) [tt 1] * *** *** (0.09) (0.00) (0.83) (0.11) (0.00) * *** ** (0.06) (0.36) (0.00) (0.03) (0.19) (0.6) * ** *** *** * ** (0.56) (0.07) (0.0) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.03) *** *** *** *** *** (0.84) (0.00) (0.8) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.0) (0.00) 19

20 APPENDIX TABLE A.1: REPLICATION OF CUNAT, GINE AND GUADALUPE (01) Table A.1 reports our replications and extension of the results in column (3) of Table VIII in Cunat, Gine, and Guadalupe (01), on the long-run effect on the firm s Book-to-Market (in columns (1) and (3)) and Q (in columns () and (4)) of a close shareholder vote to approve a shareholder-sponsored proposal related to corporate governance. For the details of the sample construction and methodology, see Cunat, Gine, and Guadalupe (01). In columns (1) and (), we separate all corporate governance proposals related to G-Index provisions from all other proposals as done in Cunat, Gine, and Guadalupe (01). In columns (3) and (4), we further separate proposals to repeal a staggered board from other G- Index related proposals. All specifications include firm fixed effects. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Book-to- Tobin s Book-to- Market Q Market Tobin s Q (1) () (3) (4) Year of meeting, t G-Index (0.43) (0.08) (0.67) (1.18) One year later, t+1 G-Index (1.5) (0.10) (0.7) (0.83) Two years later, t+ G-Index (0.7) (0.94) (0.49) (0.76) Three years later, t+3 G-Index *** ** ** (.78) (.16) (1.40) (.0) Four years later, t+4 G-Index * ** ** (1.66) (.00) (1.9) (.9) Year of meeting, t Other (0.39) (1.8) (0.38) (1.40) One year later, t+1 Other (0.49) (1.39) (0.5) (1.60) Two years later, t+ Other (0.76) (0.33) (0.7) (0.51) Three years later, t+3 Other (0.46) (0.53) (0.44) (0.81) Four years later, t+4 Other (1.08) (0.0) (1.07) (0.10) Year of meeting, t Staggered Board (1.35) (1.48) One year later, t+1 Staggered Board (1.13) (0.91) Two years later, t+ Staggered Board (0.8) (0.94) Three years later, t+3 Staggered ** Board (.08) (0.84) Four years later, t+4 Staggered Board (0.57) (0.64) N 10,356 10,356 10,356 10,356 R-squared

21 APPENDIX TABLE A.13, PANEL A: REPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF COHEN AND WANG (013) Table A.13, Panel A shows the construction of the Cohen and Wang (013) replication sample and the extended replication sample. Each replication sample is prepared as follows. For the main replication sample, we compile a list of all Delaware-incorporated firms with staggered boards that have no dual class stock. Of these, we keep the firms that have available meeting dates from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) for 010. We then separate the included firms into control and treatment groups based on the last year s meeting date month (i.e., control group comprised of firms with last year s meeting date in January, February or March; treatment group comprised of firms with last year s meeting date in September, October, November or December). We further exclude REITs and require non-missing factor model estimates and at least two days raw returns. For the extended sample, we add to the main replication sample all observations with missing ISS meeting dates for 010, for which the predict meeting dates is January, February, March, September, October, November or December. We predict the meeting date as the DEF14A filing date from SEC website plus 38 calendar days. This predictive approach is based on the average difference between DEF14A filing date and the meeting date of 38 days in the main replication sample. We then hand-check the observations to confirm that relevant meeting dates are in January, February, March, September, October, November or December and retain only those that fit that requirement. We further remove REITs and require non-missing four factor model estimates and at least two event days raw returns. Main Replication Sample: # of firms 1. file of firms with staggered board information on 1/013 7,57. Keep DE-incorporated firms 4, Keep firms with staggered boards, Keep only non-dual class firms 1, Keep firms with meeting dates available from ISS (for 010) Keep firms with meeting dates in months 1,,3 or 9,10,11, and Keep non-reits (i.e., not SIC = 6798) Require non-missing four factor model estimates and at least two event days raw 1 Treatment: 66 With returns for both events: 10 Control: 56 With returns for one event: Total Obs.: 4 Additional Firms in Extended Sample: 9. File from step (4) but with missing meeting dates for 010 from ISS Firms with predicted meeting date in months 1,,3,9,10,11,1 with missing 010 ISS meeting dates & non-missing DEF 14A file date from Exclude obs. where hand check in (10) is unsuccessful, i.e., no proxy filing date Hand-checked meeting dates for data from file in (10) Remaining firms after removing REITS (SIC=6798) Remaining firms with hand-collected verified meeting date where month of meeting date in (1,,3,9,10,11,1) Require non-missing four factor model estimates and at least two event days raw 3 Treatment: 1 With returns for both events: Control: With returns for one event: 1 Total Obs.: 45 1

22 APPENDIX TABLE A.13, PANEL B: REPLICATION AND EXTENSION OF COHEN AND WANG (013) Table A.13, Panel B shows the results of the replication of Table 1 in Cohen and Wang (013) in a sample of 1 firms in columns (1) and () and in an extended sample of 145 firms in columns (3) and (4). The table reports OLS regression estimates pooling the October 8, 010 and November 3, 010 ruling returns of two-day risk-adjusted ruling announcement returns on a treated indicator variable (Treated) and an indicator variable for the second event date (Event #). We pool the two events and multiply risk-adjusted returns on the second event date by -1. Risk-adjusted returns are computed in two steps. First, each firm's loadings on the Fama and French (1993) three factors and the Fama and French (1996) up-minus-down (UMD) momentum factor are estimated using the most recently available 10 trading days' data ending on or prior to June 30, 010. Second, risk-adjusted announcement window returns are obtained by taking the residuals from a cross-sectional regression of raw announcement window returns on the estimated factor sensitivities. All specifications include industry fixed effects. We report results estimated with six-digit Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry fixed effects in the first sub-panel, with Fama-French 49 industries fixed effects in the second panel, and with 4-digit SIC industries fixed effects in the third sub-panel. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively, based on robust standard errors clustered by the industry definition noted above each sub-panel. GICS industries Variable (1) () (3) (4) Treated Indicator * t-stat (1.09) (1.93) (0.5) (1.54) Event # Indicator (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.05) N Adjusted R-Squared Note: Observations are 85 (not 87) in (3)-(4) as GICS is missing for PERMNO = 696. Fama-French 49 industries Variable (1) () (3) (4) Treated Indicator t-stat (1.4) (1.18) (0.58) (0.6) Event # Indicator (0.09) (0.10) (0.00) (0.0) N Adjusted R-Squared SIC 4-digit industries Variable (1) () (3) (4) Treated Indicator t-stat (1.05) (0.61) (0.47) (0.14) Event # Indicator (0.09) (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) N Adjusted R-Squared

23 APPENDIX TABLE A.14: FURTHER REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS Table A.14 first presents regressions results for the adoption, in Panel A, and removal, in Panel B, of a staggered board as a function of the valuation of the firm (as captured by Q [t-1]) plus other characteristics. The sample for Panel B (Panel A) includes all firms that do (not) have a staggered board up until (and including) the year in which they remove (adopt) the staggered board if there is any such change, and are dropped from the sample afterwards. All columns use the Cox proportional hazard model (see Greene, 000) and reports the marginal likelihood (after standardizing the continuous variables to have zero mean and unit variance). All columns in both panels include but do not show for brevity the following control variables: Q [t-1], Ln (Assets) [t-1], Delaware Incorporation [t-1], ROA [t-1], CAPX/Assets [t-1], R&D/ Sales [t-1] and Industry M&A Volume [t-1]. We also include individually in Columns (1)-(9) the following proxies for investment and operational complexity and proxies for stakeholder commitment: R&D/ Sales [t-1], Ln(Intangible Assets/ Total Assets [t-1]), Ranked Patent Citation Count [t-1], Firm Sales [t-1], Research Quotient [t-1], Large Customer [t-1], Strategic Alliance [t-1], Labor Productivity [t-1], and Contract Specificity [t-1]. All variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. 3

24 APPENDIX TABLE A.14, PANEL A: FURTHER REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS Dep. Variable: Pr (Stagger in period t) Variables (1) () (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Q [t-1] *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** (7.58) (7.53) (5.41) (7.5) (4.9) (6.04) (3.6) (3.55) (3.00) R&D/ Sales [t-1] (1.16) Ln(Intangible Assets/Total Assets [t-1]) (1.44) Ranked Patent Citation Count [t-1] 0.04 (0.3) Firm Sales [t-1] *** (6.8) Research Quotient [t-1] (1.18) Large Customer [t-1] ** (.0) Strategic Alliance [t-1] (0.4) Labor Productivity [t-1] *** (6.61) Contract Specificity [t-1] (0.8) N 15,661 15,54 8,387 15,651 6,969 11,586 10,815 10,781 4,598 # of firms in regression 1,683 1, , ,378 1, 1, Pseudo R-Squared

25 APPENDIX TABLE A.14, PANEL B: FURTHER REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS Dep. Variable: Pr (De-stagger in period t) Variables (1) () (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Q [t-1] ** (1.37) (1.11) (1.08) (1.19) (.1) (1.1) (1.38) (1.10) (0.61) R&D/ Sales [t-1] (0.3) Ln(Intangible Assets/Total Assets [t-1]) (1.39) Ranked Patent Citation Count [t-1] (0.7) Firm Sales [t-1] *** (5.01) Research Quotient [t-1] (0.09) Large Customer [t-1] (0.57) Strategic Alliance [t-1] (1.49) Labor Productivity [t-1] Contract Specificity [t-1] *** (3.31) N 14,587 14,490 7,03 14,577 5,867 13,185 1,804 1,764 4,53 # of firms in regression 1,513 1, , ,447 1,41 1, Pseudo R-Squared (0.1) 5

26 TABLE A.14, PANEL C: FURTHER REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS Table A.14, Panel C presents regression results for the adoption (columns (1)-(3)) and removal (columns (4)-(6)) of a staggered board as a function of the valuation of the firm (as captured by Q [t-1]) plus other characteristics. The sample for columns (4)-(6) ((1)-(3)) includes all firms that do (not) have a staggered board up until (and including) the year in which they remove (adopt) the staggered board if there is any such change, and are dropped from the sample afterwards. We use the Cox proportional hazard model (see Greene, 000) and report the marginal effects using robust standard errors clustered at firm level (after standardizing the continuous variables to have zero mean and unit variance). The model includes the following control variables: Q [t-1], Ln (Assets) [t-1], Delaware Incorporation [t-1], ROA [t-1], CAPX/Assets [t-1], R&D/ Sales [t-1], Industry M&A Volume [t-1], Institutional Holding Duration [t-1], and Percent Transient Institutions [t-1]. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients. Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1. Cox Models Cox Models Dep. Variable: Pr (Stagger in period t) Pr (De-stagger in period t) Variables (1) () (3) (4) (5) (6) Q [t-1] *** *** *** (7.14) (7.18) (7.14) (0.94) (0.9) (0.91) Ln (Assets) [t-1] 0.1 *** 0.7 *** 0.58 *** *** *** *** (3.48) (3.35) (3.88) (9.88) (9.58) (9.88) Delaware * * Incorporation [t-1] (1.93) (1.54) (1.71) (0.0) (0.17) (0.1) ROA [t-1] *** *** *** (4.99) (4.90) (5.19) (0.85) (0.79) (0.87) CAPX/Assets [t-1] 0.11 ** ** ** (.3) (.35) (1.99) (1.66) (1.55) (1.54) R&D/ Sales [t-1] (0.7) (0.96) (0.7) (0.31) (0.4) (0.11) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] (0.47) (0.3) (0.6) (0.09) (0.15) (0.10) Institutional Holding *** *** * Duration [t-1] (3.35) (4.49) (0.98) (1.96) Percent Transient *** Institutions [t-1] (0.69) (.89) (1.00) (1.67) # of firms in regression 1,495 1,46 1,460 1,415 1,395 1,394 N 1,048 11,47 11,43 1,616 1,315 1,87 Pseudo R-Squared

27 TABLE A.14, PANEL D: FURTHER REVERSE CAUSALITY TESTS Table A.14, Panel D presents regression results for Institutional Holding Duration [t] and Percent Transient Institutions [t]. The model includes the following control variables: Staggered Board [t-1], Percent Institutional Investors [t-1], Ln (Assets) [t-1], Delaware Incorporation [t-1], ROA [t-1], CAPX/Assets [t-1], R&D/ Sales [t-1], Industry M&A Volume [t-1], Institutional Holding Duration [t-1], and Percent Transient Institutions [t-1]. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. All variables are defined in Table 1. Institutional Holding Duration [t] Percent Transient Institutions [t]. (1) () Staggered Board [t-1] (0.43) (0.99) Percent Shares Owned by *** *** Institutional Investors [t-1] (11.56) (5.99) Ln (Assets) [t-1] *** *** (7.16) (8.69) Delaware Incorporation [t-1] ** (1.17) (.37) ROA [t-1] *** *** (4.01) (7.10) CAPX/Assets [t-1] (0.49) (1.03) R&D/Sales [t-1] (0.81) (0.56) Industry M&A Volume [t-1] * (0.54) (1.83) N 30,838 31,899 Adj. R-Squared

28 APPENDIX TABLE A.15, PANEL A: FIRM VALUE AND STAGGERED BOARDS INTERACTIONS WITH INVESTMENTS AND OPERATIONAL COMPLEXITY FOR FIRMS INCORPORATED IN MASSACHUSETTS Appendix Table A.15, Panel A, presents the results of a time series analysis including interactions with variables that capture investments and operational complexity. We include the following standard control variables: Ln (Assets) [t-1], ROA [t-1], CAPX/Assets [t-1], and R&D/Sales [t-1], and Industry M&A Volume [t-1] which we do not show for brevity. The interacted variables include the following: R&D/ Sales [t-1], Intangible Assets/ Total Assets [t-1], Ranked Patent Citation Count [t-1], Firm Size [t-1], and Research Quotient [t- 1]. Individual interactions vary in their availability, as noted by the observation count for each estimated column. All continuous variables in the interaction terms are demeaned prior to calculating their interactions with Massachusetts After [t]. Estimation is using pooled panel Tobin s Q [t] regressions. We include year and firm fixed effects. All interaction and control variables are defined in Table 1. T-statistics (in their absolute value) are based on robust standard errors clustered by firm and presented in parentheses below the coefficients Statistical significance of the coefficients is indicated at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels by ***, **, and *, respectively. Dep. Variable: Q [t] Variables (1) () (3) (4) (5) After [t] (0.53) (0.64) (0.05) (0.6) (0.9) MA Incorporated x Post * ** * ** 0.08 (1.96) (.04) (1.85) (.19) (1.77) R&D/ Sales [t-1] (0.5) (1.0) (1.7) (1.0) (0.5) Ln(Intangible Assets/Total Assets [t-1]) (0.56) Ranked Patent Citation Count [t-1] ** (.18) Firm Sales [t-1] (0.0) Research Quotient [t-1] (0.07) R&D/ Sales [t-1] * 1.89 * MA Incorporated x Post 1990 (1.89) Ln(Intangible Assets/Total Assets [t-1])* 0.06 MA Incorporated x Post 1990 (0.76) Ranked Patent Citation Count [t-1] *.63 * MA Incorporated x Post 1990 (1.74) Firm Sales [t-1] * MA Incorporated x Post 1990 (0.71) Research Quotient [t-1] * MA Incorporated x Post 1990 (0.6) Standard Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes # of firms in regression N Adjusted R-squared