The Lender s Investment Strategy in P2P Lending

本文基于 人人贷 的数据, 从出借人的视角来研究出借人获取高收益的投资策略结果 发现, 按借款标的分类, 出借人投资信用认证标收益最高, 其次是实地认证标, 最低的为担保认证标 这主要是因为信用认证标的信用风险较高, 实地认证标增加了人人贷合作方对借款人实地情况的走 访, 风险有所降低, 担保认证标由第三方机构对违约借款承担连带责任, 风险进一步降低按借款投资 方式分类, 出借人选择优选理财计划的收益率显著高于散标投资方式的收益率, 原因在于优选理财投 资方式节省了交易成本, 提高了资金使用效率, 进而提高了借款收益率 P2P 网络借贷 ; 人人贷 ; 投资策略 ; 交易成本 ; 收益率 1009-9190(2014)10-0029 - 08 JEL A The Lender s Investment Strategy in P2P Lending WANG Hui-juan Abstract Based on the data of Renrendai, this paper analyses lender s investment strategy to obtain high -earnings from lender s perspectives. It was found that, in the classification based on loan object, the earnings of lender s investment in credit certification object is the highest, followed by on-site certification object, and that of guarantee certification object is the lowest. The main reason is because the risks of credit certification object are high, but the on-site certification object includes Renrendai partner s on-site investigation which decreases risks, and the risks of guarantee certification object decreases risks further because the third party is liable for the joint responsibility for non-performing loans. In the classification based on the investment channels of loans, the earnings of preferred wealth management plan chosen by borrower are obviously higher than those of scattered object, because preferred the wealth management plan decreases transaction costs, improves the utilization of funds, thereby increases earnings of loans. Key words P2P network lending; Renrendai; investment strategy; transaction cost; earnings 2014 6 5 / 71232003 71273013 P2P 2014M550036 100083 E-mail wanghj@ pbcsf.tsinghua.edu.cn 29

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P2P 1 2012 3 1 ~2013 9 1 2010 5 10 15 2012 2013 10 31

1 2 3 2 / 1 3 / 1 Panel A 3 230 13 763 39 890 4 1 38 280 3 226 13 762 1 610 0.12 0.01 95.96 99.88 99.99 4.04 AA 88 7 81 7.95 92.05 A 16 973 5 16 968 0.03 99.97 Panel B B 23 1 22 4.35 95.65 C 50 2 48 4.00 96.00 D 119 9 110 7.56 92.44 E HR 521 39 109 56 883 77 38 184 38 285 444 925 18 598 14.78 97.63 67.30 85.22 2.37 32.70 Rate β β CRDG β Lterm β _Money β Sex β Age β Marry β Edu β Income β Worktime β House β Car β House_D β Car_D β PR_G β Clocal β Cguarantee ε Rate β β CRDG β Lterm β _Money β Sex β Age β Marry β Edu β Income β Worktime β House β Car β House_D β Car_D β PR_G β Prefer ε 1 2013 22 22 2 AA 160 A 145~159 B 130~144 C 120~129 D 110~119 E 100~109 HR 0~99 32

P2P Rate CRDG AA 1 A 2 B 3 C 4 D 5 E 6 HR 7 Lterm 1 36 Log_Money Sex Age Marry Edu 1 2 3 4 Income 1 000 1 1 000~2 000 2 2 000~5 000 3 5 000~10 000 4 10 000~20 000 5 20 000~50 000 6 50 000 7 Worktime 1 1 1~3 2 3~5 3 5 4 House Car House_D Car_D PR_G Cguarantee Clocal Prefer Rate 18 598 0.131 0.132 0.011 0.080 0.244 CRDG 18 598 2.364 2.000 1.250 1.000 7.000 Lterm 18 598 23.530 24.000 9.615 1.000 36.000 Log_Money 18 598 10.531 10.589 0.687 8.006 14.914 Sex 18 598 0.772 1.000 0.419 0.000 1.000 Age 18 598 36.303 35.000 Marry 18 598 0.795 1.000 8.759 0.404 22.000 0.000 64.000 1.000 Edu 18 598 1.891 2.000 0.757 1.000 4.000 Income 18 598 4.376 4.000 1.331 1.000 7.000 Worktime 18 598 2.599 2.000 0.923 1.000 4.000 House 18 598 0.131 0.000 Car 18 598 0.151 0.000 0.337 0.358 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 House_D 18 598 0.009 0.000 0.095 0.000 1.000 Car_D 18 598 0.004 0.000 0.059 0.000 1.000 PR_G 18 598 0.133 0.000 0.340 0.000 1.000 33

1 3 226 12.15 12.00 Clocal 3 1 610 13.75 13.00 2 13 762 13.31 13.20 Panel A Diff 2-1 1.16 *** 1.20 *** Cguarantee Diff 3-1 1.60 *** 1.00 *** Diff 3-2 0.44 *** -0.20 ** Panel B 1 5 301 12.76 12.50 2 13 297 13.30 13.20 Diff 2-1 0.54 *** 0.70 *** t-test Wilcoxon-test *** ** * l% 5% 10% Cguarantee Rate p p Constant 0.154 2 *** <0.000 1 0.123 6 *** <0.000 1 CRDG 0.007 2 *** <0.000 1 0.000 7 *** 0.000 9 Lterm 0.000 5 *** <0.000 1 0.000 3 *** <0.000 1 Log_Money -0.002 0 *** <0.000 1-0.000 1 ** 0.024 4 Sex 0.000 0 0.887 6 0.000 0 0.584 4 Age 0.000 0 0.145 6 0.000 0 *** 0.000 5 Marry -0.000 7 *** 0.000 3-0.000 1 * 0.069 9 Edu -0.000 5 *** <0.000 1-0.000 2 *** <0.000 1 Income 0.000 1 0.304 5 0.000 2 *** <0.000 1 Worktime 0.000 1 0.163 8 0.000 4 *** <0.000 1 House -0.001 3 *** <0.000 1-0.000 5 *** <0.000 1 Car 0.001 9 *** <0.000 1 0.000 5 *** <0.000 1 House_D -0.002 4 *** 0.002 7 Car_D 0.001 7 0.174 0 PR_G -0.000 9 *** 0.000 5 0.001 1 *** <0.000 1 Clocal -0.012 0 *** <0.000 1 Cguarantee -0.017 5 *** <0.000 1-0.007 5 *** <0.000 1 Prefer R 2 0.251 9 0.705 3 18 598 16 988 *** ** * l% 5% 10% House_D Car_D 0 Prefer 34

P2P Heckman Prefer Rate -57.737 4 *** <0.000 1 Prefer β β Rate β CRDG β Lterm β Log_Money β Sex β Age β Marry β Edu β Income β Worktime β House β Car β House_D β Car_D β PR_G ε Probit Heckman OLS Rate p p Constant 6.646 3 *** <0.000 1 0.106 6 *** <0.000 1 CRDG 1.057 7 *** <0.000 1 0.004 8 *** <0.000 1 Lterm -0.122 3 *** <0.000 1 0.000 8 *** <0.000 1 Log_Money 0.125 9 *** 0.000 2-0.000 4 *** 0.003 3 Sex -0.038 1 0.260 0 0.000 0 0.962 7 Age 0.006 6 *** 0.000 7 0.000 0 0.236 7 Marry 0.111 9 *** 0.008 9-0.000 9 *** <0.000 1 Edu 0.041 2 ** 0.038 9-0.000 6 *** <0.000 1 Income -0.154 5 *** <0.000 1 0.000 3 *** <0.000 1 Worktime -0.1850 *** <0.000 1 0.000 7 *** <0.000 1 House 0.182 2 *** 0.003 6-0.001 6 *** <0.000 1 Car -0.217 2 *** <0.000 1 0.002 9 *** <0.000 1 House_D 0.463 6 0.200 4-0.003 7 *** <0.000 1 Car_D -1.212 4 *** 0.009 0-0.000 4 0.721 8 PR_G 0.863 4 *** <0.000 1-0.001 6 *** <0.000 1 Prefer 0.003 7 *** <0.000 1 IMR -0.003 1 *** <0.000 1 Log Likelihood -4 496.016 R 2 0.300 1 18 598 18 598 *** ** * l% 5% 10% IMR Heckman 1979 Probit Inverse Mill s Ratio Prefer 1 2 p p Constant 0.107 7 *** <0.000 1 0.100 5 *** <0.000 1 CRDG 0.004 9 *** <0.000 1 0.003 6 *** <0.000 1 Lterm 0.000 5 *** <0.000 1 0.000 4 *** <0.000 1 Log_Money -0.000 1 0.516 8 0.000 7 <0.000 1 Sex -0.000 1 0.438 1 0.000 0 0.763 6 Age 0.000 0 0.628 3 0.000 0 *** 0.008 9 Marry -0.000 7 *** 0.000 4-0.000 2 0.249 0 Edu -0.000 5 <0.000 1-0.000 2 *** 0.003 2 Income -0.000 1 0.186 3 0.000 0 0.269 1 Worktime 0.000 2 ** 0.033 8 0.000 2 *** 0.001 3 House -0.001 4 *** <0.000 1-0.000 3 * 0.066 1 Car 0.002 5 *** <0.000 1 0.002 0 *** <0.000 1 House_D -0.004 0 <0.000 1-0.004 8 *** <0.000 1 Car_D -0.000 4 0.708 5 0.007 2 *** <0.000 1 PR_G -0.001 0 *** <0.000 1-0.001 2 *** <0.000 1 Prefer 0.003 5 *** <0.000 1 0.007 0 *** <0.000 1 R 2 0.296 0 0.397 7 18 598 16 315 *** ** * l% 5% 10% Prefer 1 2 2012 12 24 35

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