Do the rules of the game determine who is playing? Institutional Change, Entrepreneurship and Human Capital

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Do the rules of the game determine who is playing? Institutional Change, Entrepreneurship and Human Capital Luca Grilli, Boris Mrkajic, Emanuele Giraudo School of Management Politecnico di Milano, Italy 2017 Luca Grilli Urbino October 2017

Starting point (1) The entrepreneurial economy (Audretsch, D. B., Keilbach, M. C., & Lehmann, E. E. (2006). Entrepreneurship and economic growth. Oxford University Press) School of Management 2

Starting point (2) Baumol, William J., and Robert J. Strom. "Entrepreneurship and economic growth." Strategic entrepreneurship journal 1.3 4 (2007): 233-237. Schumpeter mark I, Audretsch and others: knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship, Timmons and Spinelli 2003; Aghionand others: endogenous growth theory models Bruce A. Kirchhoff s various papers. School of Management 3

Starting point (3) 4 YICs needs policy s attention 2 reasons (universally acknowledged) They (may) invest less in R&D than the social optimum They (may) be financially constrained Spillovers (Nelson 1959, Arrow 1962, Teece 1986, Griliches1992, Jaffe 1996). Capital market imperfections (Storey and Tether1998, Hall 2000, Carpenter and Petersen 2002; Revest and Sapio 2012) School of Management

Starting point (4) 5 WHICH POLICY INSTRUMENT(s)? (much less agreement, see e.g. Schneider and Veugelers, 2010). Policy usually make their selection from a wide fan of instruments: direct funds targeted to startups, fiscal incentives for investors, equity and venture capital programmes, loan guarantee schemes, and others. Different governments at different latitudes opt for different instruments. Scientific evidence is of course mixed on the efficacy of these instruments, depending on different institutional contexts (different techniques used in evaluation, etc.) School of Management

The key stylized fact Shane, S. (2009). Why encouraging more people to become entrepreneurs is bad public policy. Small Business Economics, 33(2), 141 149. Acs, Z., Åstebro, T., Audretsch, D., and Robinson, D. T. (2016). Public policy to promote entrepreneurship: a call to arms. Small Business Economics, 47(1), 35 51..AMONG OTHERS (including myself, see argumentative paper in Industry and Innovation 2014) QUALITY MORE THAN QUANTITY School of Management 6

Success in the Innovative Entrepreneurship domain Founders HC IS KING Cooper and Bruno 1977; Eisenhardtand Schoonhoven1990; Shane 2000; Colombo and Grilli 2005, 2010; Ganotakis2012 among many others School of Management

Research question Can an institutional change (i.e. a new industrial policy mechanism) modify the incentives of talented individuals to opt for the entrepreneurial career in innovative sectors? Can this effect materialize immediately? School of Management

Methodology Quasi-natural experiment Regulatory change in Italy (2012) The Startup Act intended to spark the national innovation ecosystem. Targeted Young Innovative Companies (YICs). Requirements: <6 years old, < 5m annual sales, Not listed, No corporate spin-off, Innovative: Tangible IP rights (e.g. patent, license); R&D investments >15% of the revenues; >1/3 of employees/founders must hold a PhD or >2/3 must have a master degree. School of Management 9

Methodology Quasi-natural experiment School of Management 10

Methodology Quasi-natural experiment Retroactive nature of the mechanism: both firms born before and after the reform (provided that requirements are fulfilled) could gain the status of YIC and access the benefits November 2012 time Institutional change Decision to found a YIC is exogenous from the Law Decision to found a YIC is influenced by the Law School of Management

Hypotheses development We ground on two recent papers by Eberhart, Eesley, and Eisenhardt(2016; Org Sci) and Eesley (2016; Org Sci) which analyze similar issues in the Asian context Hypothesis (1): The introduced institutional reform (The Startup Act) increases the propensity of individuals endowed with high human capital to found a new venture. Hypothesis (2): The growth rather than the entry barrier removal engendered by the institutional reform (The Startup Act) increases the propensity of individuals endowed with high human capital to found a firm. Hypothesis (3): The introduced institutional reform (The Startup Act) will produce an increase in the wedge of growth performance between firms founded by individuals with low human capital and firms founded by individuals with high human capital. School of Management 12

Data Survey by the National Committee of the Italian Ministry for Economic Development on the Monitoring and Evaluation of National policies for the Eco-system of Italian Innovative Start-ups and administered by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) in April and May 2016. The questionnaire enquired about Human capital endowment of complete founding teams, Innovation strategies, Firm growth performances, Entrepreneurs assessment of the policy instruments. 5,150 eligible YICs (as of Dec 2015) were surveyed, 2,275 responded. 1,769 YICs (4,055 founders) with complete information. The final sample is ensured to be representative of the population by chisquared tests (i.e. firms location, industry affiliation, age and legal status). School of Management 13

Descriptive statistics Location: 12.93% in Milan, 7.9% in Rome, 6.1% in Turin. Industry: 31.47% in IT, 17.54% in scientific research and development. No particular correlations are large in magnitude. Variable Founded before reform (No. of founders: 542) Founded after reform (No. of founders: 3,513) Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Statistically significant difference Human capital 17.959 10.980 19.480 11.964 + *** Generic human capital 9.145 9.114 9.498 9.977 0 Specific human capital 8.813 10.945 9.982 12.710 + *** International experience 0.316 0.563 0.317 0.586 0 Gender male 0.851 0.356 0.812 0.390 *** Parent entrepreneur 0.183 0.387 0.194 0.396 0 Founding team size 2.683 1.584 2.961 2.333 + *** GDP per capita 35,378 639.539 35,378 639.362 0 TEA 0.035 0.021 0.041 0.021 + *** Age 3.390 0.512 0.842 0.791 *** Incubated 0.260 0.439 0.303 0.459 + *** School of Management 14

Estimation methods Hypotheses 1 Logit model, dependent variable dummy that equals 1 if a founder founded a company after the reform. Two specific robustness analyses: Pooled logit model. Cox event-history analysis (fairly flexible specification as it uses a semi-parametric estimation). Hypothesis 2 The same procedures as for H1, only adjusted for the growth-related reform instruments only : dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if a founder founded a company after the reform and has used or intends to use its growth instruments. Three specific robustness analyses: Pooled logit model. Cox event-history analysis (fairly flexible specification as it uses a semi-parametric estimation). Plus another pooled logit model, with two binary variables, one related to entry and one related to growth instruments. Hypothesis 3 OLS estimation with log of sales in the last year of observation (2015) as the dep. variable. The interest is in the interaction terms between the human capital and growth-related reform variables. Three specific robustness analyses: we test whether the growth-related instruments of the reform impact high-growth ambitions of entrepreneurs: R&D expenditures as percentage of total sales, internationalization intentions and the event of obtaining external funding (equity or debt) School of Management 15

Results Hypothesis 1 Analysis type Logit models Pooled logit models Cox models Model (1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) Dep. Variable Founded after reform Foundation Foundation Human capital 0.015 *** 0.010 ** 0.009 ** (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) [0.005] [0.017] [0.027] Generic human capital 0.011 0.009 0.008 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) [0.131] [0.147] [0.205] Specific human capital 0.017 *** 0.011 ** 0.010 ** (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) [0.003] [0.016] [0.022] Post reform 1.734 *** 1.742 *** 11.409 8.570 (0.135) (0.139) / / [0.000] [0.000] / / Post reform x Human capital Post reform x Generic human capital School of Management 16 0.013 ** 0.008 * (0.004) (0.004) [0.011] [0.072] 0.012 0.005 (0.007) (0.006) [0.118] [0.388] 0.014 *** 0.009 * (0.005) (0.005) Post reform x Specific human capital (0.005) (0.005) [0.001] [0.051] International experience 0.071 0.076 0.003 0.004 0.016 0.016 (0.110) (0.110) (0.004) (0.004) (0.024) (0.025) [0.520] [0.495] [0.428] [0.417] [0.529] [0.552] Gender male 0.373 ** 0.380 ** 0.003 0.004 0.056 * 0.056 * (0.159) (0.159) (0.008) (0.008) (0.033) (0.034) [0.019] [0.017] [0.674] [0.655] [0.092] [0.099] Parent entrepreneur 0.009 0.003 0.010 0.110 0.001 0.001 (0.151) (0.152) (0.009) (0.009) (0.034) (0.034) [0.952] [0.986] [0.222] [0.215] [0.997] [0.988] Founding team size 0.085 * 0.087 * 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.013 (0.046) (0.046) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.010) [0.067] [0.063] [0.634] [0.648] [0.221] [0.229] GDP per capital 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) / / [0.000] [0.000] / / TEA 27.466 *** 27.428 *** 13.837 *** 13.841 *** 4.390 ** 4.399 ** (9.486) (9.488) (2.794) (2.794) (1.950) (1.949) [0.004] [0.004] [0.000] [0.000] [0.024] [0.024] Const. 2.862 2.814 43.919 *** 43.927 *** (2.275) (2.294) (3.548) (3.548) [0.208] [0.220] [0.000] [0.000] Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Regional dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Observations 3420 3420 28381 28381 15514 15514 Founders 3420 3420 4055 4055 4051 4051 Companies 1497 1497 1769 1769 1766 1766 Log. likelihood 1311.988 1311.527 955.924 9558.837 31396.795 31396.497 Pseudo R 2 / Wald Chi 2 0.114 0.114 0.181 0.181 1.27 10 10 2.25 10 8

Results Hypothesis 1 Zoom into the key results Analysis type Logit models Model (1a) (1b) Dep. Variable Founded after reform Human capital 0.015 *** (0.005) [0.005] Generic human capital 0.011 (0.007) [0.131] Specific human capital 0.017 *** (0.006) [0.003] Ceteris paribus, an individual with high specific human capital(90 percentile of the corresponding variable) is +49.47% more likely than the same individual characterized by low specific human capital (10 percentile of the corresponding variable) to have become an entrepreneur after the reform(in the benchmark case in our estimates: Rome and IT sector). School of Management 17

Results Hypothesis 2 Analysis type Logit models Pooled logit models Cox models Model (4a) (4b) (5a) (5b) (6a) (6b) Dep. variable Founded after growth reform Foundation Foundation Human capital 0.013 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 ** (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) [0.002] [0.002] [0.021] Generic human capital 0.007 0.004 0.007 ** (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) [0.189] [0.147] [0.048] Specific human capital 0.016 *** 0.008 *** 0.006 ** (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) [0.000] [0.001] [0.043] Post growth reform 1.689 *** 1.699 *** 0.065 0.070 (0.061) (0.062) (0.080) (0.082) [0.000] [0.000] [0.416] [0.390] Post growth reform x Human capital Post growth reform x Generic human capital School of Management 18 0.008 *** 0.005 (0.002) (0.003) [0.001] [0.104] 0.006 * 0.006 (0.003) (0.004) [0.056] [0.153] 0.009 *** 0.004 (0.003) (0.003) Post growth reform x Specific human capital (0.003) (0.003) [0.001] [0.162] International experience 0.097 0.089 0.017 0.015 0.016 0.016 (0.092) (0.092) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.025) [0.292] [0.332] [0.341] [0.395] [0.528] [0.552] Gender male 0.314 *** 0.327 *** 0.062 *** 0.065 *** 0.057 * 0.056 * (0.117) (0.118) (0.022) (0.023) (0.034) (0.034) [0.007] [0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.088] [0.094] Parent entrepreneur 0.276 ** 0.284 ** 0.060 *** 0.062 ** 0.001 0.001 (0.115) (0.115) (0.022) (0.022) (0.010) (0.034) [0.016] [0.013] [0.007] [0.006] [0.997] [0.994] Founding team size 0.143 *** 0.146 *** 0.021 *** 0.021 *** 0.013 0.013 (0.041) (0.041) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.214] [0.220] GDP per capital 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 0.000 (0.000) (0.000) / / [0.000] [0.000] / / TEA 15.547 ** 15.460 ** 15.340 *** 15.346 *** 4.336 ** 4.334 ** (6.740) (6.766) (2.493) (2.494) (1.954) (1.953) [0.021] [0.022] [0.000] [0.000] [0.026] [0.027] Const. 1.634 1.583 46.020 *** 46.036 *** (1.593) (1.587) (2.983) (2.984) [0.305] [0.318] [0.000] [0.000] Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Regional dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Observations 3420 3420 28381 28381 15514 15514 Founders 3420 3420 4055 4055 4051 4051 Companies 1497 1497 1769 1769 1766 1766 Log. likelihood 2041.675 2039.826 9524.356 9523.668 31397.575 31397.490 Pseudo R 2 / Wald Chi 2 0.1009 0.1017 0.1844 0.1845 3.03 10 13 4.9 10 8

Results Hypothesis 2 Zoom into the key results Analysis type Logit models Model (4a) (4b) Dep. variable Founded after growth reform Human capital 0.013 *** (0.004) [0.002] Generic human capital 0.007 (0.006) [0.189] Specific human capital 0.016 *** (0.005) [0.000] Ceteris paribus, the increase in the probability to opt for the entrepreneurial careerforhighly skilled individuals (with respect to individuals with low specific human capital) after the reform and thanks to the decrease in growth barriersis estimated to be equal to +32.68% (again in the benchmark case in our estimates: Rome and IT sector). School of Management 19

Results Hypothesis 3 Analysis type Ordinary Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares Model (9a) (9b) (10a) (10b) Dep. variable Total sales log Total sales log Human capital 0.014 0.018 ** (0.009) (0.009) [0.106] [0.040] Generic human capital 0.025 * 0.035 ** (0.015) (0.016) [0.099] [0.031] Specific human capital 0.008 0.012 (0.008) (0.009) [0.282] [0.157] Founded after growth reform 0.220 0.228 0.561 * 0.578 * (0.246) (0.257) (0.298) (0.304) [0.373] [0.376] [0.060] [0.058] Founded after growth reform x Human capital Founded after growth reform x Generic human capital School of Management 20 0.019 * 0.023 ** (0.010) (0.011) [0.050] [0.038] 0.021 0.029 (0.016) (0.018) [0.179] [0.120] Founded after growth reform 0.017 * 0.020 * x Specific human capital (0.009) (0.011) [0.079] [0.063] International experience 0.301 *** 0.314 *** 0.274 ** 0.294 *** (0.086) (0.087) (0.110) (0.111) [0.001] [0.000] [0.013] [0.008] Gender male 0.027 0.009 0.058 0.035 (0.109) (0.110) (0.132) (0.133) [0.804] [0.937] [0.658] [0.792] Parent entrepreneur 0.091 0.084 0.063 0.044 (0.122) (0.121) (0.145) (0.145) [0.454] 0.489] [0.663] [0.759] Founding team size 0.050 0.048 0.060 0.056 (0.051) (0.051) (0.067) (0.067) [0.331] [0.342] [0.376] [0.401] Age 0.879 *** 0.880 *** 0.493 *** 0.502 *** (0.072) (0.072) (0.120) (0.120) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] Incubated 0.329 ** 0.330 ** 0.474 ** 0.476 ** (0.151) (0.151) (0.189) (0.188) [0.030] [0.029] [0.012] [0.012] TEA 1.790 1.639 0.452 0.279 (3.430) (3.428) (4.522) (4.505) [0.602] [0.633] [0.920] [0.951] Const. 0.327 0.399 1.347 1.423 (1.273) (1.291) (1.229) (1.249) [0.797] [0.757] [0.273] [0.255] Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Regional dummies Included Included Included Included Observations 2709 2709 1884 1884 Companies 1175 1175 814 814 R 2 0.2876 0.2899 0.1970 0.2018

Results Hypothesis 3 Zoom into the key results Analysis type Ordinary Least Squares Ordinary Least Squares Model (9a) (9b) (10a) (10b) Dep. variable Total sales log Total sales log Human capital 0.014 0.018 ** (0.009) (0.009) [0.106] [0.040] Generic human capital 0.025 * 0.035 ** (0.015) (0.016) [0.099] [0.031] Specific human capital 0.008 0.012 (0.008) (0.009) [0.282] [0.157] Founded after growth reform 0.220 0.228 0.561 * 0.578 * (0.246) (0.257) (0.298) (0.304) Founded after growth reform x Human capital Founded after growth reform x Generic human capital Founded after growth reform x Specific human capital [0.373] [0.376] [0.060] [0.058] 0.019 * 0.023 ** (0.010) (0.011) [0.050] [0.038] 0.021 0.029 (0.016) (0.018) [0.179] [0.120] 0.017 * 0.020 * (0.009) (0.011) [0.079] [0.063] Ceteris paribus, moving the variable Specific human capitalfrom its 10 to the 90 percentile leads to an increase in sales performance of +23%after the reform. School of Management 21

Final general robustness test May 2012 May 2013 November 2012 time Institutional change Decision to found a YIC is exogenous from the Law Decision to found a YIC is influenced by the Law School of Management

Concluding implications 1 message: change is possible and beneficial 2 message: priorities can be set School of Management 23

Thank you very much School of Management 24