On the examination of non-linear relationship between market structure and performance in the US manufacturing industry

Similar documents
What does radical price change and choice reveal?

Appendix A. Table A.1: Logit Estimates for Elasticities

Does Competition Prevent Industrial Pollution? Evidence from a Panel Threshold Model

Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg., Heft 5, 2015, Online- Anhang

Flexible Working Arrangements, Collaboration, ICT and Innovation

Labor Supply of Married Couples in the Formal and Informal Sectors in Thailand

Structural Reforms and Agricultural Export Performance An Empirical Analysis

"Primary agricultural commodity trade and labour market outcome

Gasoline Empirical Analysis: Competition Bureau March 2005

AJAE Appendix: Testing Household-Specific Explanations for the Inverse Productivity Relationship

Relationships Among Wine Prices, Ratings, Advertising, and Production: Examining a Giffen Good

Online Appendix to. Are Two heads Better Than One: Team versus Individual Play in Signaling Games. David C. Cooper and John H.

OF THE VARIOUS DECIDUOUS and

Appendix Table A1 Number of years since deregulation

This appendix tabulates results summarized in Section IV of our paper, and also reports the results of additional tests.

ONLINE APPENDIX APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTION OF U.S. NON-FARM PRIVATE SECTORS AND INDUSTRIES

Foreign Networks and Exports: Results from Indonesian Panel Data

Senarath Dharmasena Department of Agricultural Economics Texas A&M University College Station, TX

Gender and Firm-size: Evidence from Africa

Volume 30, Issue 1. Gender and firm-size: Evidence from Africa

Survival of the Fittest: The Impact of Eco-certification on the Performance of German Wineries Patrizia FANASCH

Predicting Wine Quality

Return to wine: A comparison of the hedonic, repeat sales, and hybrid approaches

Nuclear reactors construction costs: The role of lead-time, standardization and technological progress

Internet Appendix. For. Birds of a feather: Value implications of political alignment between top management and directors

The R&D-patent relationship: An industry perspective

International Trade CHAPTER 3: THE CLASSICAL WORL OF DAVID RICARDO AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

The Sources of Risk Spillovers among REITs: Asset Similarities and Regional Proximity

DERIVED DEMAND FOR FRESH CHEESE PRODUCTS IMPORTED INTO JAPAN

Demand Fluctuations and Productivity of Service Industries

Valuation in the Life Settlements Market

Fair Trade and Free Entry: Can a Disequilibrium Market Serve as a Development Tool? Online Appendix September 2014

Internet Appendix for Does Stock Liquidity Enhance or Impede Firm Innovation? *

Dietary Diversity in Urban and Rural China: An Endogenous Variety Approach

Recent U.S. Trade Patterns (2000-9) PP542. World Trade 1929 versus U.S. Top Trading Partners (Nov 2009) Why Do Countries Trade?

Gail E. Potter, Timo Smieszek, and Kerstin Sailer. April 24, 2015

Appendix A. Table A1: Marginal effects and elasticities on the export probability

THE ECONOMICS OF TEA AND COFFEE CONSUMPTION IN AUSTRALIA

The Roles of Social Media and Expert Reviews in the Market for High-End Goods: An Example Using Bordeaux and California Wines

Preview. Introduction (cont.) Introduction. Comparative Advantage and Opportunity Cost (cont.) Comparative Advantage and Opportunity Cost

The Impact of Free Trade Agreement on Trade Flows;

Curtis Miller MATH 3080 Final Project pg. 1. The first question asks for an analysis on car data. The data was collected from the Kelly

Preview. Introduction. Chapter 3. Labor Productivity and Comparative Advantage: The Ricardian Model

Selection bias in innovation studies: A simple test

IMPACT OF PRICING POLICY ON DOMESTIC PRICES OF SUGAR IN INDIA

November K. J. Martijn Cremers Lubomir P. Litov Simone M. Sepe

Lecture 13. We continue our discussion of the economic causes of conflict, but now we work with detailed data on a single conflict.

Update to A Comprehensive Look at the Empirical Performance of Equity Premium Prediction

Preview. Introduction. Chapter 3. Labor Productivity and Comparative Advantage: The Ricardian Model

Chapter 3. Labor Productivity and Comparative Advantage: The Ricardian Model. Pearson Education Limited All rights reserved.

Panel A: Treated firm matched to one control firm. t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 Total CFO Compensation 5.03% 0.84% 10.27% [0.384] [0.892] [0.

Grape Growers of Ontario Developing key measures to critically look at the grape and wine industry

ICC July 2010 Original: French. Study. International Coffee Council 105 th Session September 2010 London, England

Chapter 3. Labor Productivity and Comparative Advantage: The Ricardian Model

Preview. Chapter 3. Labor Productivity and Comparative Advantage: The Ricardian Model

Eestimated coefficient. t-value

Power and Priorities: Gender, Caste, and Household Bargaining in India

A Note on a Test for the Sum of Ranksums*

On-line Appendix for the paper: Sticky Wages. Evidence from Quarterly Microeconomic Data. Appendix A. Weights used to compute aggregate indicators

Chapter 3: Labor Productivity and Comparative Advantage: The Ricardian Model

Not to be published - available as an online Appendix only! 1.1 Discussion of Effects of Control Variables

The Nature of the Relationship Between International Tourism and. International Trade: the Case of German Imports of Spanish Wine

1/17/manufacturing-jobs-used-to-pay-really-well-notanymore-e/

A latent class approach for estimating energy demands and efficiency in transport:

Effects of political-economic integration and trade liberalization on exports of Italian Quality Wines Produced in Determined Regions (QWPDR)

The Elasticity of Substitution between Land and Capital: Evidence from Chicago, Berlin, and Pittsburgh

Demand, Supply and Market Equilibrium. Lecture 4 Shahid Iqbal

FACTORS DETERMINING UNITED STATES IMPORTS OF COFFEE

Chapter 3. Labor Productivity and Comparative Advantage: The Ricardian Model

Wine-Tasting by Numbers: Using Binary Logistic Regression to Reveal the Preferences of Experts

An Empirical Analysis of the U.S. Import Demand for Nuts

Missing Data Treatments

Inspection Regimes and Regulatory Compliance: How Important is the Element of Surprise?

Decision making with incomplete information Some new developments. Rudolf Vetschera University of Vienna. Tamkang University May 15, 2017

U.S. Demand for Fresh Fruit Imports

Online Appendix to Voluntary Disclosure and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from the 2005 Securities Offering Reform

Preview. Introduction. Chapter 3. Labor Productivity and Comparative Advantage: The Ricardian Model

Regression Models for Saffron Yields in Iran

Tariff Endogeneity: Effects of Export Price of Desiccated Coconuts on Edible Oil Market in Sri Lanka

Introduction Methods

Credit Supply and Monetary Policy: Identifying the Bank Balance-Sheet Channel with Loan Applications. Web Appendix

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF WINE ECONOMISTS

Export Spillover and Export Performance in China

Climate change may alter human physical activity patterns

Modeling Regional Endogenous Growth

Liquidity and Risk Premia in Electricity Futures Markets

Effects of Election Results on Stock Price Performance: Evidence from 1976 to 2008

Internet Appendix for CEO Personal Risk-taking and Corporate Policies TABLE IA.1 Pilot CEOs and Firm Risk (Controlling for High Performance Pay)

ICT Use and Exports. Patricia Kotnik, Eva Hagsten. This is a working draft. Please do not cite or quote without permission of the authors.

The substitutability among Japanese, Taiwanese and South Korean fronzen tuna

Financing Decisions of REITs and the Switching Effect

wine 1 wine 2 wine 3 person person person person person

Business Statistics /82 Spring 2011 Booth School of Business The University of Chicago Final Exam

Data Science and Service Research Discussion Paper

Investment Wines. - Risk Analysis. Prepared by: Michael Shortell & Adiam Woldetensae Date: 06/09/2015

DETERMINANTS OF GROWTH

Comparative Analysis of Fresh and Dried Fish Consumption in Ondo State, Nigeria

Chapter 5. On Consumption Insurance Effects of the Long-term Care Insurance in Japan: Evidence from Micro Household Data

To: Professor Roger Bohn & Hyeonsu Kang Subject: Big Data, Assignment April 13th. From: xxxx (anonymized) Date: 4/11/2016

PINEAPPLE LEAF FIBRE EXTRACTIONS: COMPARISON BETWEEN PALF M1 AND HAND SCRAPPING

Transcription:

Accepted Manuscript On the examination of nonlinear relationship between market structure and performance in the US manufacturing industry Chaoyi Chen, Michael Polemis, Thanasis Stengos PII: S01651765(17)305256 DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.030 Reference: ECOLET 7891 To appear in: Economics Letters Received date : 17 November 2017 Revised date : 14 December 2017 Accepted date : 20 December 2017 Please cite this article as: Chen C., Polemis M., Stengos T., On the examination of nonlinear relationship between market structure and performance in the US manufacturing industry. Economics Letters (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.030 This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.

Highlights (for review) Highlights We investigate the impact of market structure on industry performance. We employ a novel pooled panel threshold GMM model. Our theoretical model is based on a growthaccounting TFP framework. We use the concentration ratio (CR4) as the threshold variable. There is an inverse Ushaped curve between competition and industry performance.

*Manuscript Click here to view linked References On the examination of nonlinear relationship between market structure and performance in the US manufacturing industry Chaoyi Chen a, Michael Polemis b,c, Thanasis Stengos a* a University of Guelph, Department of Economics, Ontario, tstengos@uoguelph.ca (corresponding author) b University of Piraeus, Department of Economics, Piraeus, Greece. c Hellenic Competition Commission, Athens, Greece Abstract This paper attempts to investigate the causal link between market structure and industry performance using a micro panel data set of USA manufacturing industries over the period 19582007. We employ a novel panel GMM model strongly accounting for endogenous regressors and threshold variable. The empirical findings denote the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between market structure and totalfactor productivity (TFP). Our findings call for future research on the impact of market structure on consumer welfare. JEL classifications: C24, L1; L6 Keywords: Market structure; TFP; Threshold; Competition; Nonlinear effects. 1

1. Introduction We investigate the impact of competition on industry performance by employing threshold model techniques within a growthaccounting TFP framework. In this way, we are able to test the validity of the wellknown StructureConductPerformance paradigm (SCP) introduced and developed by Mason (1939) and Bain (1956). The latter attempts to assess the performance of a given industry and explain the twoway (linear) causation among key variables that run the SCP model. The key concept of this paradigm is that market performance is determined by the behavior of market participants, which in turn, is determined by market structure and vice versa. Although, there are certain limitations to this model, the SCP paradigm provides useful information to the policy makers and practitioners in several ways (Carlton and Perloff, 1989). The novelty of our study is that we use for the first time a panel sample splitting methodology linking competition with the level of industry performance. In this way, we argue that an industry needs to cross a certain level of market concentration (competition) in order to achieve a certain level of performance. Our findings clearly reveal the existence of a nonmonotonic relationship between market structure and industry efficiency. This gives rise to an inverted Ushaped curve between market competition and industry performance, which in turn affect consumer welfare. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model. Section 3 introduces the data and describes the empirical methodology, while section 4 discusses the empirical results and concludes the paper. 2. Model We assume that the production in the economy at time t, Yi,t, is given by the following production function: Y f( K, L, ) (1) it, it, it, it, 2

where Ki,t, Li,t and Ei,t are, respectively, the nonhomogenous sectorwide capital, labor and energy services. Following Hsieh (1999), the dual extraction of TFP growth is based on the following equation: Y r K w L m E (2) it, it, it, it, it, it, it, where r, w and m denote the real input costs (rental rate of capital, wage rate, and energy rate respectively). Taking logarithms and after some derivation with respect to time t, we get: Y s rk s w L s m E (3) K L T By rearranging we end up with the following expression: Ys K s Ls E s rs w s m (4) K L T K L T where s is the weighted share of each input to the overall production of the economy. The left hand side of Eq. (4) gives us the Solow residual (growth rate of TFP), which is equal to the weighted sum of the growth rate of real input prices (Acemoglu, 2009). In order to estimate the TFP growth rate, we take the total derivative of Eq. (1) with respect to time t: dq dt m i1 Q Xi dxi dt Q t (5) By taking logarithms and after some algebraic formulation, we have: d ln Q dt m i1 ln Q ln Xi d ln Xi ln Q dt t (6) If we use the elasticity of production and the growth rate of technical progress {T(x;t) = dlnq/dt when d m i1 X i = 0} we get: Q X T ( x; t) (7) i i By subtracting the Divisia index 1 from both sides of the Eq. (7), m X i1 i X i we take the following expression: 3

m TFP 1 1 i X i T ( x; t) (8) i1 3. Data and methodology The sample consists of an unbalanced panel data set of manufacturing industries at the fourdigit level (N = 459) over the period 19582007 (T=13). Similarly to Polemis and Stengos, (2015), all variables are taken from the National Bureau of Economic Research. Table 1, provides the descriptive statistics of the variables included in this study. It is worth mentioning that the market concentration variable (CR4), which will be used as the threshold variable displays a relatively small coefficient of variation (relative standard deviation) equaling to 0.52. It has a sample mean equal to 40 approximately, implying that the four largest companies of the sample sectors included in this study absorb around 40% of the market (i.e medium concentration). This measure departures from the threshold estimates (21.7%25%) as seen bellow (see Table 3). Table 1: Summary statistics Variables Observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max TFP5 4,361 1.016 1.049 0.161 49.040 CR4 4,361 40.050 20.930 1.000 99.300 lnship 4,361 3.359 0.539 1.221 6.517 lnk/l 4,360 0.455 0.298 1.966 1.128 lninv 4,361 1.789 0.634 0.489 4.084 lnmat 4,361 3.059 0.554 0.631 5.249 lnener 4,361 1.564 0.625 0.720 3.810 Note: TFP5, is the five factor Total Factor Productivity index (1997=1.000). CR4 denotes the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in each of the sample sectors, while lnship is the logged value of shipments expressed in real terms. LnK/L is the logged capital to labour ratio expressed in real terms, while lninv stands for the real logged total capital expenditure. The logged real total cost of materials is expressed by lnmat, while lnener is the real logged cost of electricity and fuels. The variables lnk/l, lninv amd lnener were transformed to log (X i + 0.001) in order to eliminate some zero values respectively. 4

We use the pooled panel GMM threshold method of Seo and Shin (2016). In this case, the model takes the following form: Y a X v, q it, i 1 it, t it, it, 0 (9) Y a X v, q (10) it, i 2 it, t it, it, 0 where subscripts i = 1,..., N represent the industry and t = 1,..., T indexes the time. Yi,t is the dependent variable (growth rate of TFP) 1. I( ) is the indicator function denoting the regime defined by the threshold variable and the threshold level γ0 (sample split value), while qi,t is a scalar endogenous threshold variable (CR4) that splits the sample into two different regimes (low and high). Xi,t, is a dx 1 vector of covariates. Similarly to Polemis and Stengos (2015), we include the value of shipment (SHIP) as a proxy for market size, the capital to labor ratio (K/L), the real total capital expenditure as a proxy for capital (INV), the real total cost of materials (MAT) as a proxy for intermediate inputs and finally the real cost of electricity and fuels (ENER) as a proxy for energy cost. Moreover, β1 and β2 are regime specific coefficients. Lastly, we include the relevant year (time) fixed effect (vt) and the i.i.d error term and we note that qi,t is also part of the Xi,t vector. The method proceeds in two steps. In the first step estimates of the parameters β1, β2 and γ are obtained by GMM for a selected parameter value of γ. Step one is repeated for s belonging in a strict subset of the support of the threshold variable, resulting in different estimates of β1 and β2 for each selected γ. The value of γ which minimizes the GMM objective function and its corresponding slope estimates are the optimal estimated parameters (Asimakopoulos and Karavias, 2016). Finally, following Hansen (1999; 2000) we use the SupWald test to check the 1 The standard approach to measuring firmlevel performance is to identify TFP levels or growth (Aghion et al, 2015). 5

validity of the H0 hypothesis regarding the linear formulation against a threshold formulation. 4. Results and discussion Table 2 presents the results from the benchmark parametric (linear and quadratic) specifications. We must stress though that estimating the relevant specifications with OLS fixed effects (FE) may lead to spurious results since market concentration is endogenously determined by the rest of the covariates. To effectively tackle with this problem, we adopt the instrumental variable (IV) approach using 2SLS. In the first stage, we predict the values of CR4 and CR4 2 while in the second stage we perform the regressions by using the lagged once covariates as instruments. In this case, we notice that without the inclusion of the quadratic term the effect of market structure appears to be insignificant. However, if the impact of market structure exhibits an inverseu shape, its marginal effect will be positive before reaching a threshold and become negative afterward. This may result in an overall zero effect if we force a monotonic relationship (Dai et al, 2014). With an additional quadratic term though, the estimated effects of market concentration on industry performance become statistically significant and their estimate coefficients alternate in sign starting from positive to negative. This suggests a nonmonotonic relationship in a form of an inverted Ushaped curve. Next we apply the nonlinearity test of the baseline (parametric) specifications against the threshold model. The relevant test is based on bootstrap critical values of a Wald type heteroskedasticityconsistent test where rejection of the null hypothesis implies that there is a significant threshold. From Table 3, we find that all the bootstrapped tests strongly reject linearity in favor of the threshold model in all of the 6

specifications. As a consequence, the baseline model does not capture the nonlinear effects of market structure on industry performance. Table 2: Parametric results Variable (1) OLSFE (2) IVFE (3) OLSFE (4) IVFE Constant 0.6003 *** 0.6017 *** CR4 0.0013 ** (0.0498) 0.0003035 (0.425) 0.0014 ** (0.0461) 0.002426 ** (0.027) CR4 2 0.0001 9.28e07 ** (0.039) lnship 0.57567 *** 0.5791 *** lnk/l 0.0695 *** 0.0700 *** lninv 0.156 *** 0.1567 *** lnmat 0.3964 *** 0.3986 *** lnener 0.0118 0.0116 *** (0.2184) (0.0005) CR4lnSHIP 0.0001 *** 0.00011 ** (0.0069) (0.0121) CR4lnK/L 0.0007 *** 0.0007 *** (0.0003) (0.0002) CR4lnINV 0.0002 *** 0.0002 *** (0.4858) CR4lnMAT 0.0011 *** 0.0012 *** (0.001) (0.0016) CR4lnENER 0.0001 0.0001 *** (0.7496) Observations 4,361 3,902 4,360 3,902 Note: The numbers in parentheses denote pvalues. Time dummies are included but not reported. Significant at *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% respectively. CR4 denotes the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in each of the sample sectors, while lnship is the logged value of shipments expressed in real terms. LnK/L is the logged capital to labour ratio expressed in real terms, while lninv stands for the real logged total capital expenditure. The logged real total cost of materials is expressed by lnmat, while lnener is the real logged cost of electricity and fuels. Control variables (lnship, LnK/L, lninv, lnmat, and lnener) are included but not reported. Instruments for the IV models (column 2 and 4) include the lagged set of the covariates. We proceed to estimate the threshold model under four alterative methodologies. The first two models follow Hansen s (1999, 2000) approach where the regressors and the threshold variable are assumed to be exogenous with and without fixed effects, while the last two are the GMM models with and without fixed effects. 7

From the inspection of Table 3, we find that the optimal threshold level in all of the four different methodologies ranges from 21.7% (GMMFE) to 25.2% (TR), with relatively tight confidence intervals (CI). Table 3: Threshold model results Method (1) TR (2) TRFE (3) GMM (4) GMMFE Threshold 24.7 25.0 23.1 21.7 10% CI [24.7, 25.2] [24.5, 41.4] [21.1, 25.0] [15.6, 27.7] Regimes Low High Low High Low High Low High 0.5539 *** 0.4763 *** 0.8687 *** 0.5987 *** / 4 0.5373 *** 0.4808 *** 0.9261 *** 0.9200 *** 0.6821 *** 0.5686 *** 1.0187 *** 1.0271 *** 0.1299 *** 0.1311 *** 0.0455 *** 0.0533 *** 0.2616 *** 0.2393 *** 0.2627 *** 0.2567 *** 0.3662 *** 0.2984 *** 0.6075 *** 0.5578 *** 0.4298 *** 0.3395 *** 0.5303 *** 0.6031 *** 0.0511 *** 0.0488 *** 0.0441 *** 0.0720 *** 0.1000 *** 0.0734 *** 0.0731 *** 0.0733 *** 0.0006 0.0104 *** 0.1420*** 0.1921 *** 0.0455 ** 0.0413 *** 0.1431 *** 0.1127 *** (0.9300) (0.0459) (0.0007) (0.000) 0.0002 * 0.0010 *** 0.0001 0.0001 *** 0.0054 0.0008 *** 0.0005 ** 0.0033 ** (0.0527) (0.3014) (0.4244) (0.0001) (0.0498) (0.0132) 34.3 *** 45.5 *** 54.5 *** (0.0021) 42.6 * (0.0589) Observations 3,902 3.902 3,902 3,902 Note: This table presents the estimations of the Threshold Model of Hansen with no endogeneity (1999, 2000), with (TRFE) and without fixed effects (TR), the GMM Threshold model of (Seo and Shin, 2016), with (GMMFE) and without fixed effects (GMM). The threshold variable is the level of market concentration of the four largest company in each sector of the sample (CR4 i). CR4 denotes the sum of the market shares of the four largest firms in each of the sample sectors, while lnship is the logged value of shipments expressed in real terms. LnK/L is the logged capital to labour ratio expressed in real terms, while lninv stands for the real logged total capital expenditure. The logged real total cost of materials is expressed by lnmat, while lnener is the real logged cost of electricity and fuels. Instruments for the GMM models (column 2 and 4) include the lagged set of the covariates. The numbers in braces are the 10% Confidence Intervals (CI) for the threshold in each of the four different methodologies. The numbers in parentheses denote pvalues. Time dummies are included but not reported. Significant at *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10% respectively. 8

Moreover, nearly all of the variables are statistically significant and properly signed. Specifically, market size (lnship) increases TFP, while the opposite holds when capital intensity (lninv) and material cost (lnmat) are taken into account. Similarly, the energy cost (lnener) when significant is negatively correlated with the TFP growth, while the capital to labour (lnk/l) exerts a strong positive impact. Our key variables of interest are β1 and β2 denoting the effect of competition on industry performance under the low and high regime respectively. From the relevant table, it is quite evident that the effect of competition on TFP is negative in the high ( ˆ 2 <0) and positive in the low regime ( ˆ 1>0), indicating that industry performance increases up to a certain point (threshold) in the competitive part of the curve and decreases in the more concentrated part. The coefficients are statistically significant both bellow and above the threshold in all of the four models. This is consistent with an inverse Ushaped curve also evident in other empirical studies (Dai et al, 2014; Polemis and Stengos, 2017). Overall, this study supports a nonlinear relationship between market structure and TFP, unveiling an inverse Ushaped curve between competition and industry performance, which in turns validate the SCP. Our paper contributes to the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO), since we are the first to uncover a novel nonlinear relationship between competition and industry performance. 9

References Acemoglu, D. (2009). Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton and Oxford, MIT Press. Aghion P., Cai J., Dewatripont, M., Du, L., Harrison A., Legros, P (2015). Industrial Policy and Competition, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 7(4): 132. Asimakopoulos, S., Karavias, Y., (2016). The impact of government size on economic growth: A threshold analysis. Economics Letters, 139: 6568. Bain, J.S. (1956) Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing Industries. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Carlton, D.W. and Perloff, J.M. (1989) Modern industrial Organization. USA: Harper Collins. Dai, M., Liu Q., Serfes, K. (2014). Is the effect of competition on price dispersion nonmonotonic? Evidence from the U.S. airline industry. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 96(1): 161 170. Hansen, B.E. (1999). Threshold effects in nondynamic panels: Estimation, testing, and inference. Journal of Econometrics, 93(2): 345368, Hansen, B.E. (2000). Sample splitting and threshold estimation. Econometrica, 68 (3): 575603. Hsieh, C.T. (1999). Productivity Growth and Factor Prices in East Asia, American Economic Review, 89(2): 133138. Mason, E.S. (1939). Price and production policies of largescale enterprise. American Economic Review (Suppl), 29: 61 74. Polemis, M., Stengos, T. (2017). Does Competition Prevent Industrial Pollution? Evidence from a Panel Threshold Model, Working Paper Series 1707, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis. Polemis, M., Stengos, T. (2015). Does market structure affect labour productivity and wages? Evidence from a smooth coefficient semiparametric panel model. Economics Letters, 137: 182186. Polemis, M. (2017). Revisiting the Environmental Kuznets Curve: a semiparametric analysis on the role of market structure on environmental pollution. Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, https://doi.org/10.1007/s1207601701959. Seo, M.H. and Shin, Y., 2016. Dynamic Panels with Threshold Effect and Endogeneity. Journal of Econometrics 195 (2), 169186. 10